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Chapter One: Introduction
Constitutional law scholars are in general agreement that judges, when interpreting the
Constitution, apply reasoning not explicitly found in the Constitution. However, where these
scholars disagree is over what types of reasoning or bodies of thought judges should apply when
rendering their decisions and interpreting the Constitution. This introduction takes up their
competing arguments.1 First, writers like Hadley Arkes and Robert George argue for the natural
law interpretation of the Constitution, which requires judges to focus on the substantive moral
reasoning that defines right and wrong in a particular case. In doing this, judges would have
recourse to the principles of natural law when making these decisions. The purpose would be to
connect the natural law with constitutional law. Second, there is the natural rights argument.
Randy Barnett, a natural rights scholar views the responsibility of judges in terms of protecting
the inalienable rights individuals have, preceding the formation of government. In order for the
law to be legitimate and morally binding, the government must provide adequate procedures for
the protection of these rights. Where the natural law argument requires judges to articulate
principles of how one ought to live, the natural right argument turns its attention to government
and requires judges to assess the propriety of restrictions placed on individuals by government.
The natural law tradition believes there is a correct choice. The theory of natural rights focuses
on the ability of individuals to make these choices for themselves. Finally, the common law
approach emphasizes that judges operate within a legal framework where they are to make their
decisions on important legal questions with a heavy reliance on precedent. The common law
approach is represented by the writing of James Stoner, who believes the common law approach
is distinguished from the other two alternatives because of its reliance on prudent choice.

1

The fourth argument, that of Ronald Dworkin, is addressed in the fourth chapter of this thesis.
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This thesis pursues the larger question of how judges should make decisions through an
analysis of the political and legal writings of James Wilson. In particular, the following research
question is addressed: In what manner and to what extent does James Wilson provide a theory of
Constitutional interpretation? Wilson is of particular interest for the topic of constitutional
interpretation because all three schools of constitutional thought claims ties to Wilson. In
addition, he is one of six men to sign both The Declaration and the Constitution, making him a
very influential and important founding father. However, Wilson is often forgotten amongst the
other Founders. Serving as one of the first Supreme Court Justices, his ideas on constitutional
interpretation can help unlock the many ambiguities the Constitution contains in order to help
modern judges answer important constitutional questions. The thesis of this research is that
Wilson provides a democratic theory of constitutional interpretation that combines natural law
and natural rights principles on a scientific foundation. This paper specifically focuses on
Wilson’s view of the role of a judge, and how judges should make their decisions.
In pursuit of this question, I employ the method of textual analysis recommended by Leo
Strauss (1988). Strauss’ method of textual analysis focuses on understanding past thinkers as
they understood themselves. This analysis requires three tasks of the researcher. The first is that
one must suspend their own opinions and questions in order to better understand the thought
process and inquires of the author. The second is that one is to rely, as much as possible, on
what the author says directly and indirectly. It is important in this step not to make assumptions
or to inflate unnecessary information with more meaning that is originally intended. The final
task is that one should use the author’s words directly when possible, and not rely on secondary
sources. The use of Strauss’ methodology has been used on previous studies of James Wilson
which justifies its use here (see Valesquez 1996; Zink 2009).
2

This chapter examines the three different schools of constitutional interpretation so that
they can be understood and applied to James Wilson’s own writings. The first section of the
literature review focuses on the natural law theory. Here, Hadley Arkes provides a theory of
constitutional interpretation that does not focus on the strict interpretation of the text, but focuses
on interpreting the “spirit” represented in the Constitution. Arkes argues that judges should look
to moral principles to help in this interpretation. Robert George agrees that judges should have
recourse to moral principles when interpreting the Constitution, but differs from Arkes on
originalism. For Arkes, if a judge recognizes a bad law, the judge should declare it
unconstitutional. George disagrees, placing this duty in the hands of the legislature to apply the
natural law when creating the laws. For George, if a law is bad, the Court should ignore it if it is
not within their grant of power. The second section examines the natural rights theory through
Randy Barnett. Barnett believes the role of a modern judge has degenerated from its original
purpose. He believes that if judges had recourse to natural rights when making their decisions,
they would be more effective in preserving the integrity of the Constitution. According to
Barnett, if a law is not supportive of the natural rights of an individual or of a group of
individuals, then it is not legitimate. This illegitimacy, for Barnett, allows individuals to disobey
the law because it is not morally correct. Barnett also supports originalism, specifically the
original meaning interpretation of the Constitution. The implications this has on his overall
theory of constitutional interpretation will be discussed in this section. The last section examines
the common law theory through James R. Stoner. According to Stoner, judges using the
common law theory of constitutional interpretation are required to make decisions based on
prudence and precedent, focusing specifically on the English common law. The common law is
adaptable, and therefore is able to form to the needs of each new generation. This is good in the

3

sense that the common law is flexible and fits the people, but bad in the sense that it can create
instability through frequent changes. This tension will be further analyzed in the last section.
Hadley Arkes, Robert George and Natural Law
Hadley Arkes (1990) has identified a key tension in contemporary legal reasoning. Arkes
believes that judges make false rationalizations while deciding upon a case that are separated
from moral reasoning. Arkes argues that morality and the law should be considered together,
and not be divorced from one another. For Arkes, divorcing law from morality undermines the
very purpose of the law, which is to determine what is right and what is wrong. To divorce the
two is essentially saying that there is no standard of right and wrong, just and unjust. In rejecting
this proposition, Arkes advocates the traditional position that all law has as moral background.
According to Arkes, the law of morality is antecedent to any written law and requires judges to
read the Constitution in light of the moral principles that inform right and wrong.
In the drafting of the Constitution, the Founders paid careful attention when creating the
judicial branch. They created a separate and independent judiciary to ensure that an unbiased,
apolitical entity would decide and answer the most important legal questions asked in the newly
formed nation. However, in order for the decisions made by these courts to have authority, they
had to ensure that the branch would be powerful. Arkes points to a clause in Article III, Section
2 of the Constitution stating “the judicial power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity,
arising under this Constitution” (Arkes 1990, 21).

Using this clause as the basis of his

argument, Arkes identifies the job of a judge based on the writings of Brutus, a New York writer
during the founding. Brutus is especially interesting because he is an Anti-Federalist, many of
the issues he points to, are not necessarily issues for Arkes. He quotes Brutus stating that judges
are “empowered to explain the Constitution according to the reasoning spirit of it, without being
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confined to the words or letter” (Arkes 1990, 21). Arkes agrees with this line of reasoning and
supports the idea of an active judiciary, which is not confined to the literal text of the
Constitution, but instead makes the effort to interpret what the Constitution represents, or its
spirit. Considering this, Arkes would also support the use of an unwritten constitution in the
British system. England has been able to maintain a steady form of government, without having
a written constitution because they are not confined by the literal words of a governmental
document. This is an issue often cited of the written nature of the Bill of Rights. Although it
was a requirement of the Anti-Federalists for ratification of the new Constitution, it constricts
and confines what are considered to be inalienable rights held by all humans by placing them in
writing.2
Failure to recognize this fact plagues contemporary legal reasoning. According to Arkes,
contemporary legal reasoning is faulty because of the indeterminacy of the positive law that
judges are so reliant upon. He argues that judges are molding the Constitution to their argument,
rather than trying to determine what the Constitution says, and then applying that understanding
to their argument. Arkes states “when there is a resolve to use the law, the arts of argument will
be strained to the implausible” (Arkes 1990, 6). Arkes uses the example of the expansion of the
Commerce Clause to apply to the Lake Nixon Club in Daniel v. Paul (1969). Although the club
was private, located away from main highways, and could only be accessed by country roads, the
Court still expanded the jurisdiction of the Commerce Clause by questioning whether or not the
ingredients in the food provided at the club facility had been shipped through interstate
commerce, and whether or not the records in the jukebox on the premises had been pressed out
of state. Under the guise of the Commerce Clause, the Court has expanded many other aspects
of the Constitution in order to use national regulation on a variety of personal activities. Arkes
2

On this point Arkes is in agreement with Alexander Hamilton (see Federalist #84, 442-451).
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believes judges are wrong in doing this because their arguments do not reflect the moral
principles guaranteed by the Constitution. Instead, judges focus on how to decide upon a case
using irrelevant connections to set precedents. Arkes articulates this point stating:

Instead of leading our jurists to focus on the substantive moral ground that defines
the wrong in any case, or instead of directing them to the principles that truly bear
on the jurisdiction of the national government, our jurisprudence has induced our
lawyers to expend their genius in producing the most contrived fictions. Those
fictions may be taken as formulas that somehow settle the case, even when they
illuminate nothing about the grounds of judgment that are necessary for the
law. And for the sake of fitting their decisions to these formulas, the jurists have
had to absorb canons of reasoning that must ever be embarrassing to scholars who
have any mildly rigorous training in philosophy (Arkes 1990, 6).

For Arkes, it is important to recognize the connection between morality and the law, and to
consider morality when interpreting how to apply that law. Arkes uses the example of slavery to
explain this point. He states:

The traditional connection between morals and law could be expressed briefly in
this way: When we invoke the language of morals, we move away from
statements of merely personal taste or private belief; we offer a judgment about
the things that are universally right or wrong, just or unjust. When we say then,
that any act stands in the class of a “wrong” - that is wrong for anyone, for
everyone, to hold slaves; that no one ought to hold slaves; that anyone may rightly
be restrained from owning slaves, even if the holding of the slaves would serve
his interests (Arkes 1990, 38).

Prior to the Civil Rights Amendments, slavery was permitted according to both positive law and
our nation’s Constitution. However, this does not necessarily mean that slavery was “right,” or
“just.” President Lincoln recognized this, and rather than follow the text of the Constitution,
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reflected upon natural law, and recognized that slavery was wrong. This line of reasoning is
what Arkes is trying to promote.3
In accordance with the previous example, Arkes argues that judges should have recourse
to moral principles outlined in the Constitution. He grounds his reasoning based on his
conception of the intentions of the Founding Fathers. According to Arkes, natural law is
antecedent to any form of constitutional or positive law. It provides moral truths, in which the
Founding Fathers sought to uphold in the drafting of the Constitution. Arkes states:
They understood that the federal government had the authority to reach every
legitimate object of its concern -- to reach, if need be, past the states, and to act
directly on individuals. This authority required no arcane renderings, no
ingenious reading of passages hidden in the Constitution. As our jurists
understood, that authority was contained in the simplest truths established about
the national government that was created in 1787 (Arkes 1990, 10).
These moral truths determine what is considered “right” and “wrong,” “just” and “unjust.” Arkes
applies this idea of moral truths to the Founding, stating “if we should try to understand the
principles of American law, it would be necessary to move outside the Constitution... We would
be drawn back, then, as the Founders were, to those principles of ‘natural justice’ that existed
before the formation of any government” (Arkes 1990, 10). This interpretation of the intentions
of the Founding Fathers suggests that arguments for originalism are a correct reading of the
Constitution, and follow his line of reasoning. Arkes recognizes the arguments of Raoul Berger
and Robert Bork, who he claims “have regarded any appeal to ‘natural rights’ - any appeal
beyond the text of the Constitution -- as a pretext for evading the discipline of the Constitution”

3

The danger of this line of reasoning is that it makes the Constitution give way to what is moral. This is potentially
problematic because if a judge interprets a law as being inconsistent with the natural law, would Arkes suggest to
disobey that provision of the Constitution? Given Arkes concept of originalism, it would seem unlikely. The
implications of this would be that Arkes places in the hands of the judge the ability to strike down a constitutional
provision if it is not consistent with the natural law. This is not the case for all natural law theorists, as will be
discussed in the analysis of Robert George.
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(Arkes 1990, 14). It is interesting that these two writers would disagree with Arkes, since they
both claim to originalist reasoning. If this were true, they would be supportive of natural law
reasoning because it is what the Founders intended.4 Arkes also recognizes Professor Sanford
Levinson’s argument against the idea of natural law and moral truths, in which Levinson
establishes a theory of “constitution faith.” Levinson argues “there are no moral ‘truths’ that
make one meaning of the Constitution more authoritative or compelling than another” (Arkes
1990, 11), and that the Constitution holds authority because the people allow it. However,
Arkes argues that by investing the whole of our interpretation upon the text of the Constitution,
explicit or implicit, without recourse to moral principles, the interpretation would be
incorrect. Arkes states “the Constitution produced by the Founders cannot be understood or
defended if it is detached from those moral premises” (Arkes 1990, 17). He further argues that
his opponents have given the majority the power to delegate right and wrong. This is an extreme
fault in those opponents line of reasoning, because it was very obvious in the drafting of the
Constitution and in the writing of The Federalist that the Framers intended to control and hinder
majority factions from forming.5 Arkes argues “In place of moral truths that hold their truth in
all places,” contemporary jurisprudence emphasizes“ ‘conventional’ truths that are ‘posited’ or
set down or accepted, in different places, as a reflection of the opinions that are dominant in any
country. By ‘right’ and ‘wrong,’ then, we mean: that which has been accepted or rejected, by a
majority” (Arkes 1990, 15). From this perspective, it is clear that the Founding Fathers had not
intended on a society in which justice was based upon the opinion of the majority. Examining

4

Both Robert Bork (1990) and Raoul Berger (1969) are key figures in the “restraint process” tradition, in which
judges should not consult extra-constitutional means unless they are looking within themselves. This tradition
stresses original meaning, and considers the originalist tradition to be the only neutral option in constitutional
interpretation.
5
See Federalist #10 (42-49) for the Framers’ intention to control the violence of majority factions.
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this distinction, between the intentions of the Founders and the majoritarian democracy that
exists today, is important in understanding the implications it has for modern jurisprudence.
Arkes believes modern jurisprudence and legal reasoning is very distinct and different
from the intentions of the Founding Fathers. He states:
We should be aware, then, that there is a radical separation between the
jurisprudence of the Founders, and the jurisprudence offered by conservatives and
liberals in our own day. The jurisprudence of the Founders was built on the
connection that was traditionally understood between morals and law. The
Constitution they finally produced, was our second Constitution, could be
understood and justified, only in moral terms, only by an appeal to those
standards of natural right that existed antecedent to the Constitution (Arkes 1990,
17).6
In the drafting of the Constitution, the Founding Fathers intended to present a document that
contains abstract moral principles that would guide people in their everyday lives while also
providing for a successful and orderly society. Arkes makes the argument that the Founding
Fathers had no intentions of originalist understanding. These men, being trained in the ancient
and modern philosophies of human nature, knew there would be situations that would arise that
they could not predict. Therefore, creating a binding legal document that would restrict actions
from dealing with these unknown situations in the future would not make sense. Arkes states
“since in law all cases cannot be foreseen, or expressed, it is necessary, that when the decrees of
the law cannot be applied to particular cases, there should somewhere be a power vested of
defining those circumstances, which had they been foreseen the legislator would have expressed”
(Arkes 1990, 21). If judges are confined to using the plain text of the Constitution, they would

6

It is important to note here that when Arkes refers to natural right, he is not referring to the commonly recognized
Lockean natural right. Rather, he is presenting his own understanding of natural law, and misusing the phrasing of
“natural right” to represent this idea. A better explanation of the natural law being referred to here is given by
Robert George when he states “What matters is the validity – the truth – of the theory and its capacity to shed light
on why we ought to do or refrain from doing certain things which it is in our power to do or refrain from doing, but
which we have the effective freedom – the choice – to do or refrain from doing”
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not be able to truly reflect and decide upon a case with equal and fair justice. In order for judges
to arrive at the best answer to a given case, it is imperative they consult natural law.
Robert P. George gives an in depth description of the natural law in three principles.
The first principle is “a set of principles directing human choice and action toward intelligible
purposes” (George 2001, 102). This set of principles is directed toward what George refers to as
“basic human goods.” According to George “It is the integral directiveness of these goods that
excludes certain options as practically unreasonable, even in circumstances in which they are, to
a certain extent, rationally grounded, and thus distinguishes what is morally right from what is
morally wrong” (George 2001, 3). This idea entails that when faced with a situation where
multiple solutions may seem rational, one must reflect upon this set of principles to decide which
option is the best choice. By concretely applying practical reason through these principles, one
can better identify morally right and wrong answers, even in a situation where both options
appear to be rational. In addition to this, George explains that these principles “prescribe actions
which people have reasons to perform because they constitute opportunities to realize for
themselves and/or others benefits whose intelligible value is not merely instrumental” (George
2001, 17). Instrumental goods are goods that are worthwhile for their own sake, so it is not
difficult for people to realize the benefits in participating in action that work towards these
goods. However, when the benefit is not worthwhile in its own sake, it is up to the individual to
reflect on the morality of an action and to understand its beneficial impact, even if the act itself
does not provide beneficence.
George’s second principle of natural law posits that natural law contains a “set of
‘intermediate’ moral principles which specify the most basic principles of morality by directing
choice and action toward possibilities that may be chosen consistently with a will toward integral
10

human fulfillment and away from possibilities the choosing of which is inconsistent with such a
will” (George 2001, 102). This second principle is similar to the first in that it teaches
individuals to act in the benefit of the whole, as opposed to the individual benefit. George
describes this stating “the most basic principles refer to ends or purposes which provide noninstrumental reasons for acting. These principles identify intrinsic human goods as ends to be
pursued, promoted, and protected, and their opposites as evils to be avoided or overcome
(George 2001, 102). According to George, the natural law provides this, and it is the job of the
law maker and the citizen to pursue actions that will achieve these ends. George states “moral
norms guide action by directing choice toward fully reasonable possibilities and away from
possibilities that, while not utterly irrational, are practically unreasonable” (George 2001, 118).
By consulting the moral norms established by the natural law an individual can modify their own
action to achieve intrinsic human goods.
Finally, George’s third principle is that the natural law contains “fully specific moral
norms which require or forbid certain possible choices” (George 2001, 102). These fully specific
norms are what are best exemplified through the creation of the law. George states “it is in the
order of ‘doing’ that we identify the need to create law for the sake of the common good. The
lawmaker creates an object – the law – deliberately and reasonably subject to technical analysis –
for a purpose that is moral, and not itself merely technical” (George 2001, 107). These
lawmakers use both practical reason and moral norms in order to establish a law that is good and
morally right, stating “Where the laws are just, authorities serve their communities well; where
they are unjust they serve their communities badly. The moral purpose of a system of laws is to
make it possible for individuals and sub-communities to realize for themselves important human
goods that would not be realizable in the absence of the laws” (George 2001, 107). Although the
11

first two principles of natural law suggest that individuals are able to establish through practical
reasoning, moral norms that exist within the confines of the natural law, the third principle seems
to suggest that without law, individuals would not be able to arrive at a complete understanding.
Having established the three principles of natural law, George presents the question of the
judiciary’s position in combining positive law and natural law. George states “The vexed
question of American constitutional interpretation is the scope and limits of the power of judges
to invalidate legislation under certain allegedly vague and abstract constitutional provisions”
(George 2001, 110). George’s view of the judge is more limited than Arkes. For Arkes, if a law
is bad, then a judge should void it. For George, it is the job of the legislature to translate the
natural law into positive law, and for a judge to invalidate a bad law would be outside of the
scope of power granted to the judiciary. George states “to the extent that judges are not given
power under the Constitution to translate principles of natural justice into positive law, that
power is not one they enjoy; nor is it one they may justly exercise” (George 2001, 111). Arkes
would disagree. The Constitution itself, according to Arkes, is based upon natural law moral
principles. The job of the judge is to translate and apply these principles when different
constitutional questions are presented. By not allowing a judge the power of judicial review, in
the sense of determining the moral right or wrongness of a given piece of legislation, the judge is
essentially powerless in its role as a check on the legislature. George states that the natural law
theory treats the role of a judge as “fundamentally a matter for determination, not for direct
translation from the natural law. It does not imagine that the judge enjoys a matter of natural law
a plenary authority to substitute his own understanding of the requirements of the natural law for
the contrary understanding of the legislature or constitution maker in deciding cases at law”
(George 2001, 110). George believes it is not within the scope of power for a judge to be any
12

more than a voice as to what the Constitution or facts presented determine. By allowing a judge
to translate the natural law, the fear is that the judge will not correctly translate what it is the
natural law entails. Instead, the judge will reflect upon their personal understanding of natural
law, and wrongfully apply it. George describes what he believes to be the role of the judge,
stating “for the sake of the rule of law, understood as ordinarily a necessary condition for a just
system of government, the judge is morally required to respect the limits of his own authority as
it has been allocated to him by way of an authoritative determination” (George 2001, 110). This
authoritative determination would be either the constitution maker or the legislature as described
previously.
Despite the differences between Arkes and George, there is one similarity that is key.
For both Arkes and George, the law must be understood in light of the moral principles of the
natural law. The Constitution itself does not say whether or not it is the job of the legislature of
the judge to do this. This is a source of disagreement between Arkes and George. What is
known is that the natural law is proscriptive, and teaches individuals how one ought to live.
Randy Barnett and Natural Right
Randy E. Barnett argues that in order for a Constitution to have legitimacy, it must
protect natural rights. This line of thinking is different from the common idea that a Constitution
gains its legitimacy by being recognized by the consent of the governed. The people as
sovereign provide authority to the government to allow it to make decisions on their behalf.
Barnett rejects this theory, and provides his own theory for constitutional legitimacy grounded in
the protection of natural rights.7 He argues that the Constitution as it was originally written is
7

Natural rights can be describes as “Natural or inherent rights were the rights persons have independent of those
they are granted by government and by which the justice or propriety of governmental commands are to be judged”
(Barnett 2004, 58). The purpose of the natural rights theory is to protect individual’s rights from the government.
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not reflected in modern jurisprudence. He believes that by recognizing the true meaning of the
Constitution, and the true basis of legitimacy, the Constitution as it was intended can be restored
to its respected authority.
To describe the distinction between the intended Constitution and its modern
interpretation Barnett states “The Constitution that was actually enacted and formally amended
creates islands of government powers in a sea of liberty. The judicially redacted constitution
creates islands of liberty rights in a sea of governmental powers” (Barnett 2004, 1). Barnett
believes that modern judges are doing their job incorrectly, and are destroying the true meaning
of the Constitution because they do not have recourse to natural rights. Barnett creates the
analogy of natural rights to building a bridge, stating “A respect for these rights is as essential to
enabling diverse persons to pursue happiness while living in society with others as a respect for
fundamental principles of engineering is essential to building a bridge to span a chasm” (Barnett
2004, 81). It is essential that the government, and inherently their lawmaking/constitutional
interpretation have recourse to natural rights. According to Barnett, the Founders supported
these views of natural rights, conceptualizing rights as both limited and limitless (Barnett 2004,
53). It is important that the law have respect for the natural rights of one individual, while at the
same time restricting them so they do not infringe on the natural rights of others.
Barnett addresses the issue of the common conception of legitimacy by defining it as
“whether a particular legal regime is accepted by the public or some substantial portion thereof”
(Barnett 2004, 48). Barnett argues against this definition, claiming that legitimacy and the
validity of the law is determined by “whether a validly enacted law merits the benefit of the

The natural law theory focuses more on the question of how one ought to act, as opposed to placing restrictions on
government.
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doubt and a prima facie duty of obedience” (Barnett 2004, 48). He argues that people should not
follow the laws because a majority has approved it. Instead, citizens should look towards a
given law, and decide whether or not it is morally acceptable and does not infringe upon their
natural rights. If it does, then the law should not be followed or recognized. Barnett states
“human laws that violate natural rights are not obligatory; only those human laws that respect
natural rights can be obligatory” (Barnett 2004, 85). He supports this statement stating “we
should care, and consequently, may owe a prima facie duty to obey a law, only if the processes
used to enact laws provide good reasons to think that law restricting freedom is necessary to
protect the rights of others without improperly infringing the rights of those whose liberty is
being restricted” (Barnett 2004, 51). To Barnett, it is important that people follow the law
because they are bound by their conscience to do so, not because it is what the government tells
them to do (Barnett 2004, 76). In support of this he states, “A lawmaking system is legitimate,
then, if it creates commands that citizens have a duty to obey. A constitution is legitimate if it
creates this type of legal system” (Barnett 2004, 12). If a legal system supports laws that
infringes upon the liberties of others, then it is restricts natural rights and cannot bind the people
in conscience, but must instead do so through coercion. Barnett states “For a law is just and
therefore binding in conscience, if its restrictions are (1) necessary to protect the rights of others
and (2) proper insofar as they do not violate the preexisting rights of the persons on who they are
imposed” (Barnett 2004, 44). Barnett’s formulation of legitimacy therefore rejects the idea that
the consent of the majority is the source of the people’s attachment to the law.
Barnett bases his theory on the idea of natural right, which states that people have rights
antecedent to the formation of government, and that people formed societies in order to better
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protect these rights.8 He uses the Founders as a support of this theory, stating that the Founders
view was “first come rights, and then comes the Constitution” (Barnett 2004, 4). Therefore,
Barnett believes “if a constitution contains adequate procedures to protect these natural rights, it
can be legitimate even if it was not consented to by everyone; and on that lacks adequate
procedures to protect natural rights is illegitimate even if it was consented to by a majority”
(Barnett 2004, 4). In his opinion, the Founders had this theory in mind when creating the
Constitution. However, in order for the Constitution to be approved and ratified, some of the
minor details of the Constitution needed to be changed in order to win over the majority.9 Would
this be considered an example of why the Constitution does in fact derive its authority from the
people? The words of the preamble would seem to suggest that the power to authorize the new
Constitution was directly by the people. The Preamble to the United States Constitution states
“We the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice,
insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and
secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this
Constitution for the United States of America” (Preamble). The term “We the people” has been
used as a common phrase when discussing the liberties and rights guaranteed to the public by the
Constitution. However, Barnett would argue the answer to the previously posed question is no.
Barnett believes that consent can only be recognized as a legitimate source of authority if it is
unanimous. Majority consent does not compel the people to follow the law. Barnett states “For
8

The clearest expression of this in the American political tradition is in the second paragraph of The Declaration of
Independence where it is written: “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they
are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of
Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the
consent of the governed, That whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right
of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new government, laying its foundation on such principles and
organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.”
9
Accordingly, the Constitutional requirement (Article VII) that the consent of nine of thirteen states is required to
ratify the Constitution would be a concession to prudence according to Barnett and not an example of the Founder’s
commitment to majoritarian principles.
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consent to bind a person, there must be a way to say ‘no’ as well as ‘yes’ and that person himself
or herself must have consented… No person can literally consent for another” (Barnett 2004,
21). Therefore, majority consent would not be satisfactory to the legitimacy of government.
With the theory of natural rights in mind, the job of judges is to interpret the meaning of
the text of the Constitution, while simultaneously ascertaining gaps in constitutional
understanding. Filling in these gaps allows for the construction of new interpretations and
applications of the law. However, Barnett is a strong supporter of originalism, believing the
original meaning interpretation is the best. Barnett believes that “constitutional legitimacy based
on natural rights, rather than popular sovereignty or consent, can ground a commitment to
originalism” (Barnett 2004, 117). It is important to note here that he argues strictly for the
original meaning interpretation and not original intent. Original intent is what the Founders’
intended in the drafting of the Constitution. Original intent proves hard to support due to the
lack of historical evidence to support the claims to the Founding Fathers’ intentions. Original
meaning examines how the people interpreted the Constitution when it was ratified. Barnett
recognizes that the Constitution has vague language, which allows for construction within a
certain extent for proper interpretation. Barnett states “interpretation determines the meaning of
words. Constitutional construction fills the inevitable gaps created by the vagueness of these
words when applied to particular circumstances. Vagueness must exist before construction is
warranted, however, and any construction must not contradict whatever original meaning has
been discerned by interpretation” (Barnett 2004, 100). The distinction he makes here is
important between interpretation and construction. Many originalist thinkers assume that by
interpreting the Constitution without a rigid textual reading is incorrect. However, Barnett
distinguishes interpretation, which is determining what the words mean, from construction which
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modernizes and changes the Constitution to adapt to modern political questions. Barnett
recognizes that there is a need for both when interpreting the meaning of the Constitution. Each
of these factors is not mutually exclusive, and is dependent on the other. It is important that
construction has recourse back to the text of the Constitution, but is not confined to that text.
Barnett describes the modern power of judicial review as “not limited to refusing to
enforce an unconstitutional law being applied to an individual… Modern judicial review also
includes a power to command or order other branches of government to follow the judiciary’s
interpretation of the Constitution” (Barnett 2004, 143). Barnett views the judiciary as a powerful
entity, with power over the other two branches. He sees the court as not just a check on the
legislature and executive, but as a policer of their actions and roles, with the Constitution
providing their authority.
James Stoner and the Common Law
Stoner evaluates the common law tradition through Coke, who he views as an innovator
in the common law tradition. He states “’What Shakespeare has been to literature, what Bacon
has been to philosophy, what the translators of the Authorized Version of the Bible have been to
religion, Coke has been to the public and private law of England’” (Stoner 1992, 15). English
law, as well as the law of the United States, places certain emphasis on the importance of
precedent. Since the common law itself is unwritten, and needs to remain so, precedent
represents what is most analogous to what a written form of the common law would or could be.
Stoner writes “One never can and never should forget the source of American common law, nor
should one ignore that its spirit pays homage to the wisdom embedded in tradition… common
law is said to exist wherever precedents have the force of law, although traditionally precedents
are seen to indicate common law, not create it” (Stoner 1992, 6). It is important to remember
18

that precedent upholds the law, but can be faulty. It indicates what the law should be, but can be
altered at any time and is not a permanent determination of what action should be taken in every
situation, universally.
The most important aspect of the common law tradition for Coke is how it is used when
making judicial decisions. The importance of precedent in judicial decision making is to fill and
address the gaps and ambiguities left in the written law through broad construction. Coke
believes judges should think like common law lawyers and look towards the applicable general
aspects of the law, as well as like a member of Parliament, looking at the particulars. Stoner
outlines Coke’s conception of the aspects of common law into five points (Stoner 1992, 19). The
first is “Law is concerned first of all with right and wrong, not simply with policy, as we tend to
assume today” (Stoner 1992, 19). This is important with Coke’s conception of precedent,
because it is important to not just accept a law because it is written. Positive law is not always
“right,” and it is important for judges and lawyers to look at positive law, in comparison with the
reasoning of common law to determine whether or not it is “right,” or “wrong.” The idea of
denying a law’s legitimacy based on its moral foundation is also seen in the natural law theory
and the natural rights theory as previously noted. The second aspect Stoner describes is “the law
Coke is concerned with is English law, especially English common law, not universal law, and it
is characterized above all by land law and due process, which together form the basis of English
liberties” (Stoner 1992, 19). It is important to understand that the common law is concerned with
the general aspect of right and wrong, but not on a universal level. It is important that a judge
look to the given facts of a case as well, since not all former precedent can necessarily be applied
in every case. Although a case may seem similar, it is important to look at the intricacies in the
case, and determine whether or not the case precedent that is going to be applied is truly
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analogous to the case at hand, or something different. According to this line of reasoning, it is
the job of judges to decide this. This differs from the natural right or natural law perspective that
Arkes and Barnett both share. For both of those writers, the law is universal, and has recourse to
natural law/natural right principles which are universal. Coke does not seem to agree with this
line of thinking. The third tenet of Coke’s common law is “while it belongs to one land, law has
a variety of sources, many of which are in the distant past, though the question of law’s origin is
altogether secondary to the question of its rightness” (Stoner 1992, 19) This tenet is similar to
the second, in which a law must be looked at in the detail of its application, and not be applied
universally without considering whether or not it is the right authority for a given situation.
However, Coke’s version of “right” has recourse to common law only, and does not have
recourse to what has been suggested by the previously analyzed writers.
The fourth tenet of Coke’s common law is “law is rational, though one must take special
care to understand what Coke means by legal reason” (Stoner 1992, 19). Coke’s legal reasoning
is very important to the overall understanding and distinction of Coke’s school of thought
compared with Hobbes. Coke believes reason is within a certain set of institutions, stating
“Reason is not original and comprehensive; rather, it takes what is given and works upon it,
improves it” (Stoner 1992, 23). This reasoning falls in line with the approval of using precedent.
Rather than being an active judge, who creates law, Coke looks for judges to reason with the law
that is provided, and determine whether or not it can be applied. The idea is not to invalidate the
reasoning of previous judges and courts, but to use their decisions to work for modern concerns.
It is important to refine the law, rather than create it to try to find a definitive decision or answer
to a legal question. The law is indefinite, and the common law being unwritten, ensures its
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indeterminacy and need for application of particulars rather than application of broad general
concepts. According to Stoner, reasoning for Coke is
Not the sole cause of law; it takes much for granted, from custom, perhaps or
from authority. But reason permeates the law; testing whether any proposition
advanced conforms to the law as a whole, determining when law must be
reformed to meet abuses, explaining authorities and thus preparing them to serve
as precedents in future cases that may arise (Stoner 1992, 26).
Based on this, Coke argues that judges, when interpreting and deciding legal questions, should
look at the particulars and determine where precedent can fill in the gaps that the ambiguities in
the law create. In order to do this, Stoner would argue that one should look towards Coke’s idea
of the common law, which would encourage a form of originalism when interpreting the
Constitution, but not a rigid interpretation that is typically associated with originalist thought.
This originalism would still allow judges to look outside of the text of the Constitution, but only
to the extent of using the common law as an interpretative tool.10 Stoner writes “But surely here
Coke is giving to judges only the power to except out of general words a situation in which a
maxim of common law would be violated; there is no reason to say that this cannot count as
statutory interpretation every bit as much as in the precedent he cites” (Stoner 1992, 57).
Although Coke is in full support of a less rigid form of originalism, he does not support judicial
activism necessarily in the way it is practiced in the United States. This line of thinking is in
direct opposition to Hobbes, who believes you should look towards general principles within the
law and apply those to a given case, rather than looking towards the particulars of precedent and
the common law conception of right and wrong. Along this line of reasoning is support from
Coke for judicial review, but in a limited sense. Stoner writes “Coke’s precedents and his entire
corpus of writing about the law suggests that from his point of view the innovation would have
10

For examples of rigid originalist thinkers, see the decisions of Justice Antonin Scalia and the writings of Robert
Bork.
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to argue that judges must restrict themselves to the mechanical application of statutes whenever
possible” (Stoner 1992, 61). By restricting a judge to precedent, it is hard to imagine innovation
in the law. This is a perfect example of why Hobbes opposes the common law reliance on
precedent.
The fifth tenet warrants more discussion because it involves a major distinction between
Coke and Hobbes. The fifth tenet is “what is law remains to some extent a question that can
never be definitively answered, thought the tentativeness or openness of law itself is worthy of
notice” (Stoner 1992, 19). Coke and Hobbes differ on their approach to the law. Where Coke
looks at the question of “What is Law” Hobbes looks towards the question of who rules, and how
to ensure the authority of the sovereign is absolute. Stoner writes “The law, to Coke, is thus a
science in something like the Aristotelian sense of a practical science, joining reason and
knowledge of particulars, yet contained not in books as a body of knowledge but in the minds of
those who can use it. This is why, despite Coke’s insistence on recording cases, documenting
legal developments, and studying old books, the common law itself remains unwritten” (Stoner
1992, 18). Coke relies on meaningful interpretation of the law through the application of the
common law, trusting the reasoning of others to come to the right answer. Hobbes, however, is
more calculated with his legal reasoning. Hobbes does not favor the idea of an unwritten rule of
law that is supposed to govern the way the written law is interpreted. He instead looks towards
the role of the sovereign to determine what is right and what is wrong within the law. Stoner
quotes Hobbes, states “Civil Law, is to every Subject, those Rules, which the common-wealth
commanded him, by Word, Writing, or other sufficient Sign of the Will, to make use of, for the
Distinction of Right, and Wrong; that is to say, of what is contrary, and what is not contrary to
the Rule” (Stoner 1992, 73). However, Coke would disagree with Hobbes’ favor with a written
22

or sovereign given form of law. Stoner states “Coke recognizes that the obscurity of the origin
of common law is in some respects the secret of its success: It makes the law in its most
fundamental points unwritten and thus leaves it always dependent upon reason for its discovery,
confirmation, and elaboration” (Stoner 1992, 67). Coke’s style of reasoning is similar to
Aristotelian prudence. This relies on reflection of the ancient philosophers as well to interpret
the true meaning and purpose of the law. Stoner describes Hobbes’ opposition to this by stating
“it must be clear that the manner of thinking characteristic of the common lawyer belongs rather
to the drunkenness of the old moral philosophers than to the sobriety of scientific reason” (Stoner
1992, 84). Hobbes’ science of politics does not include precedent, because he believes precedent
is binding and constricts the rule of law to what other judges have decided. However, if
precedent did not exist, there would be no consistency within the law which would not work in
an organized society. Coke’s understanding of the law is separate from this understanding.
Hobbes seems to think that law is a product of politics, something created by the sovereign,
where the sovereign, whoever it may be, has the ultimate authority to decide the outcome of a
given legal issue. Coke does not agree with this according to Stoner, who claims “his responses
make clear that politics is an activity either within law or beside law, rather than that law is a
product of politics” (Stoner 1992, 28). Stoner’s analysis seems to suggest that Coke and the
common law tradition would not agree with grounding law within science. The common law
tradition emphasizes flexibility. By basing the law on scientific principles, this flexibility is lost.
Flexibility is an important function of the common law tradition in terms of why the
common law should apply to American constitutionalism and the question of how judges should
make decisions. In order for the Constitution to fit the people of the United States, and for the
people to see it as legitimate, it must fit their values. It is important then, in the drafting of the
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Constitution, that the English common law be used as a basis for creating a new form of
government. The English common law was what the people were accustomed to and aware of.
Therefore, it would seem impractical to consult outside sources when creating a system of law.
By completely starting from scratch and consulting outside sources of law, the new system of
government would not fit the people. Stoner explains this need for familiarity with the law in the
drafting of the Constitution when he describes the common law tradition as:
The common law approach to politics involves the citizen or legislator conceiving
his task as judge or advocate within a legal frame: viewing each controversy as a
matter, not for free invention or for fresh deduction from first principles, but for
judicious choice, with attention to precedent always in order but authoritative
solution always elusive. The common law proceeds by reason, but by reason that
collects and judges particulars – by a sort of Aristotelian practical reason – rather
than by reason in the modern, Enlightenment, analytical sense – the reason that
breaks apart and reassembles (Stoner 1992, 177)
By consulting the English common law, the Founders exercised prudent choice when developing
a new system of law. The flexibility of the common law allows it to be molded to the needs of
the people it governs, and is therefore a more prudent choice to constitutional interpretation than
the use of scientific reasoning according to Stoner.
Chapter Overview
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows.
Chapter Two discusses James Wilson’s concept of popular sovereignty. This chapter will
discuss how Wilson’s concept of popular sovereignty is multi-dimensional, consisting of
principle sovereignty and derived sovereignty, which will be explored through these two
dimensions, as well as its implications for the U.S. The first dimension will focus specifically on
the placement of principle sovereignty in the hands of the people. The second dimension of
sovereignty is displayed through the structure of government as provided by the Constitution.
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Derived sovereignty can be viewed in the constitutional structure of government through
representation, separation of powers, and federalism.
Chapter Three elaborates on the role of the judge as Agent-plus in Wilson’s thought. By
applying Wilson’s multidimensional concept of sovereignty, the role of the judge can be used as
a guide to understanding Wilson’s overall theory of constitutional interpretation. Here I will
examine the judge and the judicial system, as well as Wilson’s restrictions on judges through the
three specific roles he designates for them. Wilson’s judge has the responsibility of carrying out
the role of an agent, a representative and an educator of the people.
Chapter Four turns its attention to Ronald Dworkin’s theory of constitutional
interpretation. Focusing on Dworkin’s value based theory of interpretation, particular attention
is paid to the implications of Dworkin’s theory of the moral reading for how one understands the
law and judicial decision making. The chapter will also discuss Dworkin’s ultimate rejection of
the majoritarian premise and originalism. The chapter ends with a discussion of the similarities
and differences between Dworkin’s constitutional theory and Wilson’s, where Wilson rejects
Dworkin’s theory for its tendency to provide judges too much power without the proper
constitutional limitations.
Chapter Five summarizes Wilson’s theory of constitutional interpretation and compares it
with the four theories that are analyzed in the previous chapters. Then it discusses one of
Wilson’s own judicial opinions from the case of Chisholm v Georgia (1793), and shows how
Wilson’s theory works in practice, as well as discusses its implications for modern jurisprudence.

25

Chapter Two: James Wilson’s Theory of Popular Sovereignty

In the creation of the United States Constitution, the delegates at the Constitutional
Convention were faced with many difficult issues that were in need of resolving from the
Articles of Confederation.1 One of these issues is the problem of sovereignty. As Madison
explains in “Federalist #39,” the proposed Constitution presents a mixed governmental system,
including both national and federal divisions of power. Madison describes the new Constitution
as:

In its foundation it is federal, not national; in the sources from which the ordinary
powers of the government are drawn, it is partly federal, and partly national; in
the operation of these powers, it is national, not federal; in the extent of them
again, it is federal, not national; and finally, in the authoritative mode of
introducing amendments, it is neither wholly federal, nor wholly national
(Federalist #39,199).
In the formation of the United States Constitution, the delegates created an “American” form of
sovereignty, including a division of powers between the national government and the respective
individual state governments. This new “American” form of sovereignty is important because of
its strong commitment to popular sovereignty, an issue that has been widely debated since the
ratification of the Constitution.2 According to Mogg, the commitment to popular sovereignty
combined with the need to overcome its practical problems is essential to the formation of an
American conception of sovereignty (Mogg 2006, 10; see also Greene 1986).

1

The Articles of Confederation did not provide a proper government structure for the colonists. The Articles had the
issue of dividing power among the states and national government, as well as determining sovereignty, the nature of
representation, and the extent of powers granted to the national and state governments. For issues with the Articles
of Confederation see the Federalist Papers #21-23, 99-116; #30, 146-48; #36-38, 172-193; #40, 200-203; #42-44,
215-236; #46, 242; #54, 285-286; #78, 401.
2

The topic of sovereignty is central to the great political debates of American political history. These debates
include Lincoln/Douglas and Webster/Hayne.
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The widespread acceptance of popular sovereignty in America is not without its problems
however. Nowhere is this clearer than with the judicial branch. According to the logic of
popular sovereignty, the people are the sole sovereign. The judicial branch is not popularly
elected, but appointed. Therefore, there are no direct ties between the judicial branch, and the
sovereign, the people. Due to this lack of connection, the question of the legitimacy of these
decisions is raised. If decisions run counter to the beliefs or values of the people, what would
create attachment to the law? This creates problems especially for the discussion of judicial
review. A central issue is that the Court, through judicial review, has the ability to rule against
the wishes and preferences of the people. Wilson works to reconcile this tension between
popular sovereignty and judicial review.

This chapter begins by laying out a multi-dimensional understanding of sovereignty.
Using the logic of the principle/agent relationship, sovereignty can be conceptualized as
consisting of principled and derived dimensions. The former refers to the authority from which
power is derived (the power that makes government) and the latter to the authorizing power
granted to the agent to work toward the ends of society. The second and third sections of this
chapter find in the political and legal thought of James Wilson evidence indicating that he
understands sovereignty in these terms. According to Wilson, the American people are the
principle sovereign and are responsible for the creation and limitation of government. Unlike
other social contract theorists, Wilson does not view government/society as artificial. Viewing
man as a social creature who naturally enters society and government, Wilson argues that
government is natural.

Government at both the national and state levels, are created to execute

the will of the people. This does not mean that they have unlimited authority to pursue these
ends. Wilson limits the power of government by conceptualizing the relationship between
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principled and derived sovereigns as a representative trust where government is further restrained
by checks and balances as well as federalism. These restrictions ensure that derived sovereignty
can safely be placed in government and prevent tyranny. Finally, the chapter concludes by
considering Wilson’s understanding of sovereignty as elucidated here in light of other scholarly
interpretations. Other scholarship mistakenly views sovereignty as a single dimension. Not only
is this an inaccurate reading of Wilson, but calls into question accounts of Wilson on judicial
decision making that incorrectly maintain that sovereignty consists only of a single dimension.

Sovereignty as a Multi-Dimensional Concept

The United States Constitution is grounded on a single, multidimensional theory of
sovereignty (Mogg 2006, 3). This single, multidimensional theory of sovereignty can be
conceptualized as a principle-agent relationship. In government, the principle-agent relationship
is present to determine how authority should be allocated. The principle, in the situation, is
where the initial authority comes from. Looking towards the creation of the United States
Constitution, each Founding Father had a different idea of where this authority originates.
Patrick Henry captures the apparent nature of this tension when he states:

My political curiosity, exclusive of my anxious solicitude for the public welfare,
leads me to ask who authorized them to speak the language of, We, the
People, instead of We, the States? States are the characteristics, and the soul of a
confederation. If the States be not the agents of this compact, it must be one great
consolidated National Government of the people of all the States (Storing 1985,
297).
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Generally, scholars follow the dichotomy identified by Henry by focusing on the choice between
national sovereignty on the one hand, and state sovereignty on the other hand.3 When one
employs the principle-agent relationship when looking at sovereignty, one finds that the simple
national/state sovereignty dichotomy obscures a more fundamental distinction in the American
understanding of sovereignty.4

In order to understand the framework of the principle-agent relationship applied in the
United States Constitution, it is important to discuss each dimension of this model in detail. The
first dimension is principle sovereignty. Principle sovereignty is the authority from which power
is derived. This is the authority on which government is created. However, the questions that
are most often debated when discussing principle sovereignty is: Who is the final authority?
Who are the parties to the contract? There are three answers to the question according to the
Founding Fathers. First, the people in their collective capacity are held sovereign. According to
this understanding, every decision made by the people in their collective capacity is deemed to
constitute the common good. The concern with this understanding is clearly identified by James
Madison in “Federalist #10” as the problem of faction. Madison identifies faction as “a number

3

Literature showing that the Founders created a confederal system where the states are sovereign includes Berger
(1987). Literature arguing that the Founders created a national system where the American people are sovereign
includes Wood (1998, 362), Rossiter (1966), Onuf (1988), and Diamond (1992). Finally literature arguing that the
Founders were guided by neither principle nor abstract political philosophy, but by their private interests includes
Beard (1935).
4

Interpretations of theorists addressing the topic of sovereignty demonstrate that the principle/agent relationship has
historically informed the debate over sovereignty (Mogg 2006). For a theorist like Bodin, the sovereign is seen as
the “earthly image of God” (Bodin 1992, 46). However, the sovereign in his example fits into the principle-agent
model and serves as the agent. For Bodin, the principle is the laws of God and nature (Bodin 1992, 10). For
Hobbes and Locke, the principle appears to be the people in the state of nature (Locke 1980, 47-48; 52-53; 56;
Hobbes 1994, 110). This is not to suggest that Hobbes and Locke are in complete agreement on the topic of
sovereignty. While Hobbes views the sovereign as ultimate in power and authority (Hobbes 1994, 109) Locke
views the difference of express and tacit consent as a way of determining the power of the selected sovereign upon
the people in their collective capacity (Locke 1980, 347-48).
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of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and
actuated by some common impulse of passion or of interest, adverse to the rights of other
citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community” (The Federalist #10, 43).
The job of government according to Madison is “To secure the public good, and private rights,
against the danger of such a faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and form of
popular government, is then the great object to which our inquires are directed” (The Federalist
#10, 45). The fear of faction was widespread among the Founding Fathers in the creation of the
Constitution.

The second holds that the states are sovereign. This understanding is that the people are
represented through their respective states. The states themselves are seen as individual
sovereigns containing both principle and derived sovereignty. In thinking about the first two
understandings of principle sovereignty, the Constitution can be read as supporting both
interpretations. The Preamble, on the one hand, begins with “We the People…” and ratification
of the Constitution, on the other hand, is done on a state-by-state basis (Article VII). Both
conceptions of principle sovereignty support the decision of the Founding Fathers in the drafting
of the Constitution to include a series of checks and balances and a clear separation of powers.
The idea of federalism would ensure that the principle sovereign would retain their sovereign
power while creating a separate federal government. This would remain true whether the
Founders believed the principle sovereign was the people in their collective capacity, or the
separate states. A third option is suggested by Mogg (2006) where the people are sovereign at
the state level, but not at the national level. For example, the people of Massachusetts are
viewed as the principle, and the Massachusetts state government serves as the agent. The
Massachusetts state government gains their power from the people who reside in Massachusetts.
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Therefore, the Massachusetts state government is responsible for carrying out the wants and
needs of the people in their state. Each state deals with different issues depending on their
constituents. According to Mogg, it does not appear that states can possess both aspects of
sovereignty. To the extent that states do contain principle and derived sovereignty, it is only
with regard to the ratification or amendment of the Constitution (see Article V and Article VII).

Derived sovereignty is the second dimension of the principle-agent relationship. Derived
sovereignty is the authority/power that the principle grants to the agent. Another way of looking
at this bond is as a trust. The principle sets standards to achieve a specified goal (ends of
government). The agent is entrusted with power from the principle to work towards that goal,
and satisfy the principle’s standards. In accordance with this conception of the principle/agent
relationship of sovereignty, what can be agreed upon by all is that principle sovereignty is
absolute, indivisible, and nontransferable (Mogg 2006, 184-85). Without these three aspects, the
principle-agent relationship cannot work.

The aspect of sovereignty being absolute means that it is only limited by the ends of
government. This is important because it is by the ends of government that the value of society
is evaluated. Depending on which political theorist one looks to, there are many different “ends
of government” that limit the derived sovereign and inform our evaluation of the derived
sovereign’s performance. For Bodin, it is the acceptance of God. Bodin states “For as much as
by the goodness of the end we measure the worth and excellence… so that by how much the end
of every city or commonwealth is better or more heaven-like, so much is it be to be deemed
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worth to excel the rest” (Bodin 1962, 3D).5 For Locke, the preservation of property serves as the
ends of government (Locke 1980, 27-28; 45-46). Locke believes this is achieved when
government is conceptualized as a trust who is responsible for dictating the life, liberty, and
property of the people. For Rousseau, the end of government is the common good. Rousseau
says the purpose of government is to “defend and protect, with the whole of its joint strength, the
person and property of each associate, and under which each of them, uniting himself to all, will
obey himself alone, and remain free as before” (Rousseau 1994, 54-5). Rousseau looks at the
role of sovereignty in terms of a community where the sovereign is governed by the general will
of the people. The general will is absolute in areas of common interest, limited only by the ends
of government (Mogg 2006, 70). In order to achieve each of these ends of government, it is
essential the principle sovereign contain absolute authority. If the principle sovereign does not
retain absolute authority, it will not be able to properly delegate power to the agent in the
principle-agent relationship.

Indivisibility is the inability to divide the authority of the principle sovereign. The
principle sovereign contains all of the authority, and although power can be derived from this
initial authority, it can never be dissolved or divided. The principle sovereign always retains its
power. The principle sovereign serves as the final and sole authority. There can only be one
principle sovereign. If there is more than one principle sovereign, an issue is created in the
principle-agent relationship. It becomes inverted. If more than one principle sovereign exists, it
allows the agent to strategically become the principle. If the agent does not agree with the
dictates of one principled sovereign, they can turn to another based on their own preference.

5

For the 1962 version of Bodin, citations refer to the page number and section.
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This creates an issue in achieving the ends of government as designated by the principle
sovereign. If the agent has the ability to choose how they use the power allocated to them with
full discretion, the principle is essentially dividing their power and sharing it with the agent.
This is why indivisibility is important to maintaining the principle-agent model.

The last aspect of the principle/agent relationship is that principle sovereignty remains
nontransferable. Hobbes makes this very clear when he discusses the obligation of the sovereign
to maintain his/her/their power. For Hobbes this serves as a limitation upon his ultimate
sovereign, stating “There can be no breach of the covenant on the part of the sovereign; and
consequently none of his subjects, by any pretense of forfeiture, can be freed from his
subjection” (Hobbes 1994, 111). Derived sovereignty however must be transferable. Making
the second dimension of sovereignty transferable allows for an open acceptance of the decisions
made with the power of the derived sovereign, while also binding the whole to its actions. The
principle sovereign has the initial, non-transferable authority so that it can better allocate and
transfer power to the agent, so that it can perform certain functions. The agent is in place so that
it can act towards the goals the principle wishes to achieve. Where the principle is limited by the
ends of government, the agent works towards those ends. This is clearly seen in the United
States Constitution with the separation of powers. Each branch is allocated certain powers in
order to achieve the ends of government, which are essentially the happiness and the acceptance
of the people at large. This sentiment can be found in Alexander Hamilton’s analysis of the
Preamble of the Constitution in “Federalist #84,” in which he states that the Preamble “is a better
recognition of popular rights, than volumes of those aphorisms, which make the principal figure
in several of our state bills of rights, and which would sound much better in a treatise of ethics,
than in a constitution of government” (Federalist #84, 445). The restriction of principled
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sovereignty being non-transferable assures the first two aspects of principled sovereignty
(absolute and indivisible), further maintaining the need for a single sovereign.

Political theorists have given considerable attention to the three aspects of principled
sovereignty. Given the two dimensions of indivisibility and nontransferable, the key question is
who or what is sovereign? For Rousseau, it is the separation of sovereignty from power, Locke
trust, and Blackstone suffrage.6 For Hobbes and Blackstone, sovereignty is artificial in nature.
Therefore they disagree with the concept of authority being non-transferable and feel power must
be transferred either indirectly or directly. For Bodin, the power is transferred from the people to
the sovereign King. Once the power is transferred to the King, it cannot be returned. According
to Locke and Rousseau, sovereignty is real and serves as a social construct of government.
Locke looks at government as a social construct and manifestation of popular sovereignty,
including a trust similar to the model of the principle-agent relationship. Rousseau focuses
heavily on the transfer of power. According to Mogg (2006, 72), the Founders conception of
sovereignty is somewhere between Locke and Rousseau in their commitment to popular
sovereignty. The Founders refine Locke’s position, and provide avenues in which popular
sovereignty can be exercised within the confines of government. The Founders also refine
Rousseau into a less robust view of sovereignty and the transfer of power. The Founders, using
the principle-agent relationship of principle and derived sovereignty, attempted to resolve the
tension created by political theorists’ analysis of what sovereignty should have recourse to when
drafting the Constitution. They were faced with the challenge of creating a situation where they

6

Wilson supports the idea of Lockean trust, stating “when such trust is abused, it is thereby forfeited, and devolves
to those, who gave it” (Wilson 2007, 441). Locke looks at trust in government to secure the individual rights and
liberties of the people.
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can all accept the indivisible nature of sovereignty, while at the same time seeming to divide it.
The Founders respond to the issue of indivisibility by creating a federal system. Although there
is a division of powers between the national and state governments, the national government
remains supreme. This is clearly exemplified in the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution found
in Article VI. The power of the states can never overpower the federal government if the initial
authority is given to it.

James Wilson: Principle Sovereignty

For Wilson, the principle sovereign is the people, and derived sovereignty is seen as an
administrative function left to the national government and the states. According to Wilson’s
pyramid of government, “The authority, the interests, and the affections of the people at large are
the only foundation, on which a superstructure, proposed to be at once durable and magnificent,
can be rationally erected” (Wilson 2007, 833-34). The people in their collective capacity serving
as the principle sovereign are essential to Wilson and are essential in the creation of government
and society. Wilson states “the supreme or sovereign power of the society resides in the citizens
at large; and that, therefore, they always retain the right of abolishing, altering, or amending their
constitution, at whatever time, and in whatever manner they shall deem it expedient” (Wilson
2007, 441).7 As to why Wilson places principled sovereignty in the hands of the American
people, it is necessary to consider his view of human nature.

7

It is also important to note that Wilson refers to the people in the national sense, not the people of their respective
states. This distinction was stated earlier in the discussion of who should be viewed as the principle sovereign
according to the Founders.
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Wilson views humans as social creatures, therefore making the formation of society and
desire to better maintain their natural liberty and property a consequence of a natural
inclination/instinct.8 Wilson notes “It is not fit that man should be alone” (Wilson 2007, 621).
This sentiment of sociability which is natural in all humans drives men together in order to better
their own lives, and to help maintain their own self-preservation. Wilson describes society as:

Each individual would engage with all the others to join in one body, and to
manage, with their joint powers and wills, whatever should regard their common
preservation, security, and happiness. In consideration of this engagement, made
by each individual with all the others, all those others would engage with each
individual to protect and defend him from injury, and to secure him in the
prosecution of every just and laudable pursuit. These reciprocal engagements
from each individual to all the others, and from all the others to each individual
from the political association. Those who do not enter into them are not
considered as a part of the society (Wilson 2007, 553-54).
In accordance with the separation and division of sovereignty within this newly formed society,
Wilson states “When the society was formed, it possessed jointly all the previously separate and
independent powers and rights of the individuals who formed it, and all the powers and rights,
which result from the social union” (Wilson 2007, 556). With the people being the principle

8

This touches on the tension between natural law and natural right found in Wilson’s political and legal thought. In
“Rethinking America’s Modernity,” Eduardo Velasquez focuses on Wilson’s natural law teaching (Velasquez 1996,
194). Wilson views natural law with an emphasis on self-preservation, which is most likely influenced by Hobbes
and Locke (Velasquez 1996, 195). Through a further analysis of Wilson on Scripture, Velasquez shows that
Wilson’s initial praise of Thomistic natural law turns out to be an argument in favor of modern natural right, where
happiness or pleasure is the foundation of natural law (Velasquez 1996, 200-205). Given this emphasis, it is then
possible to reject the Thomistic reading of Wilson and instead focus on Wilson’s grounding of natural law on
feelings (moral sentiment) where reason serves as a servant of human emotions (Velasquez 1996, 199). In “The
Language of Liberty and Law,” James R. Zink makes an effort to reconcile the primacy of natural rights with the
political necessity of fostering a sense of civic duty and attachment for the public good amongst the citizenry in
Wilson’s political thought. He supports the idea that Wilson was a strong supporter of natural rights serving as the
standard of legitimacy that requires the ongoing consent of the governed beyond the initial establishment of
government (Zink 2009, 449). Zink also mentions the affiliation with Thomistic natural law, but agrees with
Velasquez that Wilson is more of an advocate for natural rights. Zink states “…Wilson’s writings and speeches
make apparent the founding generation’s thoroughgoing commitment to the natural rights political philosophy”
(Zink 2009, 443).
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sovereign in which the authority to create government is based, it is clear that the consent of the
people is essential to create and maintain the state. Consent works for Wilson because of man’s
social nature. This is important because it distinguishes Wilson’s liberalism from Barnett’s
(2004). The idea of common consent being the root in the origin of society is what creates a
sense of equality and security. According to Wilson, “consent is the sole obligatory principle of
human government and human laws” (Wilson 2007, 579). Wilson explicitly states this later in
his lectures, stating “…with one common consent, whatever regards their preservation, their
security, their improvement, their happiness. In the social compact, each individual engages
with the whole collectively, and the whole collectively engage with each individual” (Wilson
2007, 636). This common consent creates a bond between the individual and others that agree to
enter into society.
Wilson’s emphasis on consent speaks to a similarity between his thought and that of
Locke. However, it is important to note that there is a distinction between Wilson’s political
thought and Locke’s social contract theory. Locke argues that the primary reason man leaves the
state of nature in order to enter society is to secure and enjoy property (which includes life,
liberty, and estate) (Locke 1980, 46). Wilson, drawing on the philosophy of the Scottish
Enlightenment, views man as a social animal, which is much closer with the ancient
understanding of the creation of society.9 According to Wilson, the idea of society served as an

9

Velasquez reviews Wilson’s conception of man as a social animal. He states “Above all, the principles of
sociability are not incompatible with the view that government is constituted by the consent of the governed.
Consent implies mutual recognition of and thus mutual regard for the rights of our fellow human beings” (Velasquez
1996, 211). Velasquez also touches upon Wilson’s idea of the moral sentiment, which suggests that individual
passions are necessary in order to maintain good government and a healthy society (Velasquez 1996, 211). He
further emphasizes this, stating “Wilson’s purpose in alerting us to the role necessity plays in bringing us together is
not to deny the spontaneous and genuinely other-directed passions by which human society is bonded” (Velasquez
1996, 213). In the Section VI on Consent, Velasquez also makes the argument that Wilson’s “social” animal is
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attractive option for savage man living in the state of nature. Wilson describes society as “the
powerful magnet, which by its unceasing though silent operation, attracts and influences our
dispositions, our desires, our passions, and our enjoyments” (Wilson 2007, 621). Society is able
to do this through the creation of laws and the development of social obligation through the
creation of government.

Once man has formed society, there appears to be a necessity for the creation of
government. According to Wilson, government is instituted in order to increase the liberty of the
people, perfect society, and protect their natural rights. Wilson states “Government was
instituted for the happiness of society… let government – let even the constitution be, as they
ought to be, the handmaids; let them not be, for they ought not to be, the mistresses of the state”
(Wilson 2007,635). The people being the principle sovereign for Wilson, it is important that
government be instituted not only by their consent, but also by their will. Wilson asks the
question “Does man exist for the sake of government? Or is government instituted for the sake
of man” (Wilson 2007, 1053)? Given Wilson’s strong support of a social contract theory, and of
the common consent of man being the only legitimate force of obligation of individuals to the
laws of society and government, it would appear that he agrees with the later statement. Wilson
describes the mutual dependence that society imposes on the people, stating “Society supposes
mutual dependence: mutual dependence supposes mutual wants: all the social exercises and
enjoyments may be reduced to two heads – that of giving, and that of receiving: but these imply
different aptitudes to give and to receive” (Wilson 2007, 637). Although man is expected to
forfeit some of his natural liberty in order to empower society, society and government is not the
more “gregarious,” than “political,” which suggests his rejection of Wilson’s social animal as similar to that of
Aristotle or Thomas (Velasquez 1996, 214). This idea is dependent upon Wilson’s conception of man in the state of
nature, which is influenced by his teaching in the Scottish Enlightenment.
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sovereign. Wilson describes natural liberty as “provided he does not injury to others; and
provided some public interests do not demand his labors. This right is natural liberty. Every
man has a sense of this right. Every man has a sense of the impropriety of restraining or
interrupting it” (Wilson 2007, 638). The people retain their natural liberty for the most part,
when entering upon society due to the knowledge Wilson describes. However, Wilson also
identifies two restraints on natural liberty. The first restraint is that his/her actions may not harm
another. This concept falls within the lines of equity. The government must protect the natural
liberty of all citizens, therefore restricting others from doing anything that would prevents
another from expressing their natural liberty. The second restraint requires that their action may
not interfere with the needs of society as a whole. This entails that people will push aside their
selfish desires in order to attribute to the betterment and perfection of society. This action is
driven by the moral sentiment. Wilson further emphasizes this point, stating “The right of
natural liberty is suggested to us not only by the selfish parts of our constitution, but by our
generous affections; and especially by our moral sense, which intimates to us, that in our
voluntary actions consist our dignity and perfection” (Wilson 2007, 639). According to Wilson’s
conception of human sociability, a social duty is created by society. Libertarians often argue that
the act of consent is not binding and consequently, there is only a duty to obey the laws of
society when there is unanimity (Barnett 2004, 12, 25). Wilson’s social duty serves as an
effective response to this argument through his conception of the laws serving as an educational
function.

Laws serve as the educational function in expressing social duties, in order to create
better citizens. Wilson describes the science of law as “the study of every free citizen, and of
every free man. Every free citizen and every free man has duties to perform and rights to claim.
39

Unless, in some measure, and in some degree, he knows those duties and those rights, he can
never act a just and independent part” (Wilson 2007, 435). In order for individuals to become
better citizens, it is important they know what is required of them in order to maintain society.
Wilson says “Our progress in virtue should certainly bear a just proportion to our progress in
knowledge” (Wilson 2007, 525). Good laws educate individuals to not only become virtuous
citizens, but also serve to educate the people on natural law, while also serving as a protector for
natural rights. Wilson describes the importance of education stating “But law and liberty cannot
rationally become objects of our love, unless they first become the objects of our knowledge”
(Wilson 2007, 435). The laws should teach the people about how to discover the law of nature,
and therefore obligate them to act by those laws. Wilson describes the laws of nature as “the
measure and the rule; they ascertain the limits and the extent of natural liberty” (Wilson 2007,
639). Natural law serves as a standard for how individuals “ought” to live. The natural law,
which is endowed into our hearts by God according to Wilson, is accessible to us through the
guidance of the moral sentiment. Natural rights serve as a standard for how government ought to
behave. Natural rights are a restriction on the government’s encroachment on the people’s
natural liberty. Once the people have gained a proper understanding of the natural law and
natural rights, they are able to determine the proper course of action for bringing society closer to
enlarging the right of natural liberty to a point beyond that achieved in the state of nature.
Therefore, in order for the people to serve as the principle sovereign in Wilson’s conception of
popular sovereignty, it is required that the people are educated on the natural law and natural
rights. Wilson emphasizes this point stating “the principles of a law education are matters of the
greatest public consequence” (Wilson 2007, 44). It is only through this education that limited
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government is possible.10 Wilson states “Among the ancients, those who studied and practiced
the sciences and jurisprudence and government with the greatest success, were convinced and,
by their conduct showed their conviction, that the fate of the states depends on the education of
the youth” (Wilson 2007, 906). In order for society to be happy, Wilson considers education to
be a necessary tool. Without knowledge of the laws of nature, the people will not be able to
successfully form a society that will benefit their wants and needs.

With this conception of natural liberty, it is important to create a society that will allow
for this natural liberty to be maintained and protected. If this natural liberty is not protected, the
people at large will not consent to it. According to Wilson “The only rational and natural
method, therefore, of constituting civil society, is by the convention or consent of the members,
who compose it. For by a civil society we properly understand, the voluntary union of persons in
the same end and in the same means requisite to obtain that end. This union is a benefit, not a
sacrifice: civil is an addition to natural order” (Wilson 2007, 635). If entering into society
requires the complete forfeit of individual rights and natural liberty, there is no obligation to the
rules and laws created by this new society. Wilson states “Every citizen, as soon as he is born, is
under the protection of the state, and is entitled to all the advantages arising from that protection:
he, therefore, owes obedience to that power, from which the protection, which he enjoys, is
derived” (Wilson 2007, 641). In accordance, Wilson states the purpose of government is to
“secure and to enlarge the exercise of the natural rights of its members; and every government,
which has not this in view, as its principal object, is not a government of the legitimate kind”

10

This conception of the laws serving as an education tool is supported by ancient political theorists. See Aristotle’s
Nicomachean Ethics (2002, 1103a-b; 1152a; 1179b-1180; 1111b ;). On the relationship between education and
perfectibility in the thought of Wilson see Zink (2009, 453).
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(Wilson 2007, 1061). Therefore, according to Wilson, the answer to his previously proposed
question is “Man does not exist for the sake of government, but government is instituted for the
sake of man,” which remains consistent with his idea of the people serving as the principle
sovereign (Wilson 2007, 1083).

For Wilson, the people in their collective capacity serve as the principle sovereign.
Principle sovereignty is absolute, indivisible, and nontransferable and as such, “the supreme or
sovereign power of the society resides in the citizens at large; and that, therefore, they always
retain the right of abolishing, altering, or amending their constitution, at whatever time, and in
whatever manner they shall deem it expedient” (Wilson 2007,441). Government is instituted in
order to better secure and protect the natural rights, liberties, and property of citizens. Obligation
and attachment to this government is instituted through a common consent, similar to the initial
consent of savage man entering into society. Wilson states “I would say, that no other person on
earth can oblige him, but that he certainly can oblige himself. Consent is the sole principle, on
which any claim, in consequence of human authority, can be made upon one man by another”
(Wilson 2007, 572). It is the job of government to maintain the common consent, and achieve
the goals set forth by the will of the people with the derived power it receives.

James Wilson: Derived Sovereignty

Society and government receive their power and authority from the people. Madison
makes this point in “Federalist #39,” stating “we may define a republic to be, or at least may
bestow that name on, a government which derives all its power directly or indirectly from the
great body of the people; and is administered by persons holding their offices during pleasure,
for a limited period, or during good behavior. It is essential to such a government, that it be
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derived from the great body of the society, not from an inconsiderable proportion, or a favored
class of it” (Federalist #39, 194). Wilson supports this idea of the government deriving all power
from the people in its collective capacity when he discusses the concept of trust. He equates this
concept with the revolution principle, stating “that, the sovereign power residing in the people;
they may change their constitution and government whenever they please – is not a principle of
discord, rancor, or war: it is a principle of melioration, contentment, and peace” (Wilson 2007,
443).11 In order for the people to trust the authority bestowed in government, they must know
they are the ones who originally allocated that power, and that the power contained within
government is for the purpose of working towards their own happiness. Consequently, it is
important that government does not infringe upon the natural liberty of its citizens. This is an
action that would betray the trust and obedience bestowed upon it. Wilson states that “in order to
obtain the blessings of a good government, a sacrifice must be made of a part of our natural
liberty” (Wilson 2007, 1055). However, it is important to note that man does not sacrifice his
natural liberty completely. Wilson identifies the job of government as enlarging and securing
“the exercise of the natural liberty of man: and what I say of his natural liberty, I mean to extend,
and wish to be understood, through all this argument, as extended, to all his other natural rights”
(Wilson 2007, 1055). This argument for the job of government reflects the natural rights
influence in James Wilson’s political thought.

11

For Wilson, this connects the Constitution to what, for him, is the central theme of the American Revolution;
popular sovereignty. The second paragraph of the Declaration of Independence states: “We hold these truths to be
self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights
that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. – That to secure these rights, Governments are
instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, -- That whenever any Form of
Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or abolish it, and to institute new
Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem
most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.” Society and government is formed in order to serve as an agent to
the wants and preferences of the people, therefore reinforcing the idea of popular sovereignty as a principle-agent
relationship.
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The derived sovereign has the job of achieving the ends of government in which the
principle sovereign intends. For Wilson, the ends of government as previously stated are to
increase the liberty of the people, perfect society, and to protect the natural rights of individuals.
These ends of government entail a need for equality, happiness and trust of the people. Trust in
particular, refers to the earlier discussion regarding the nature of the principle-agent relationship
where the principle authorizing the agent to do something can be viewed as a trust. Two separate
jobs are implied by the nature of this trust. The first is the power of a delegate. The agent must
supply what the people want. However, what the people want is not always what is best for
society. Therefore, the second job of the agent is to serve as trustee. The government must
review what the people want, and determine the best way to achieve this, without negatively
effecting society. As trustee, the agent is granted considerable power and it is thus necessary to
prevent the agent from abusing this power. Wilson achieves this and ensures that the agent
works toward the ends of society through the Constitution’s system of representation, the
separation of powers, and federalism.

Representation

It is important to Wilson that representation be free and equal. Wilson defines
representation as “the chain of communication between the people and those, to whom they have
committed the exercise of the powers of government” (Wilson 2007, 834). However, Wilson
recognizes the need for artificial persons to serve as actors in government in order to better
achieve what they people want and need.12 Wilson states “To the legitimate energy and weight of

12

According to Wilson, in the eyes of government, people are divided into two kinds; natural and artificial. Wilson
states “Natural persons are formed by the great Author of nature. Artificial persons are creatures of human sagacity
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true representation, two things are essentially necessary. (1) That the representatives should
express the same sentiments, which the represented, if possessed of equal information, would
express. (2) That the sentiments of the representatives, thus expressed, should have the same
weight and influence, as the sentiment of the constituents would have, if expressed personally”
(Wilson 2007, 837). Wilson wants representatives to have strong links with the people’s
sentiments, but at the same time echoes a similar notion of refining the voice of the people seen
in “Federalist #10.” There, James Madison writes that the government created by the United
States serves to “refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a
chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom at best discern the true interest of their country, and
whose patriotism and love of justice, will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial
considerations” (The Federalist #10, 46). However, refinement does not allow for unrestrained
discretion. It is important that representatives remain true to the will of the people. Wilson
states “The members will be apt to forget the source from which they have received their powers.
Every government, in order to preserve its freedom, has frequent need of some new provisions in
favor of that freedom. Such new provisions are most likely to spring from those, who have been
recently animated by the inspiration of the people” (Wilson 2007, 723). It is necessary to the
legitimacy of a representative government that the people retain trust in their representatives. If
representatives act against the will of the people, the people have the right to remove them.

Frequent elections serve as an important feature of free and true representation because
they assure that the government is aware of the new and changing opinions of the people at large.
Wilson states “A representation, inadequate, unequal, and continued too long, is inconsistent

and contrivance; and are framed and intended for the purposes of government and society” (Wilson 2007, 829).
Government requires artificial persons in order to achieve the ends of government.
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with the principles of free government: for by such a representation, it is probably the sense of
the people will be misapprehended or misrepresented, or despised” (Wilson 2007, 723). It is
essential to the principle-agent relationship that the wants and needs of the people are not
misinterpreted. If the wants and needs of the people are not known to government actors, the
agent in the principle agent relationship cannot work towards the ends the principle is
designating for their happiness. This need is expressed through not only the frequent election of
Congress, but also the existence of term limits on the President, and the term limits on local
authorities. Term limits guarantee that if the people are not satisfied with their government
officials, they will be able to express their dissatisfaction in the next election. Term limits help
to retain the authority of the people as principle sovereign.
It is also essential to Wilson’s theory of representation that suffrage be free and open as
well. Wilson states “Every citizen, who circumstances do not render him necessarily dependent
on the will of another, should possess a vote in electing those, by whose conduct his property, his
reputation, his liberty, and his life, may be all most materially affected” (Wilson 2007, 838).
Wilson believes that the right of suffrage is the most important connection between the people at
large and government. It serves as the strongest link in the principle-agent relationship. Wilson
states “the right of suffrage, properly understood, properly valued, and properly exercised, in a
free and well constituted government, is an abundant source of the most rational, the most
improving, and the most endearing connection among the citizens” (Wilson 2007, 836). The
right of suffrage also entails the people at large to be educated, by good laws, what is necessary
and essential to maintaining a healthy and happy society. Wilson describes the purpose of
representative government in length, stating:
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Men, frail and imperfect as they are, must be the instruments, by which
government is administered. But, in order to guard against the consequences of
their frailties and imperfections, one effort, in the contrivance of the political
system, is, to provide, that, for the offices and the departments of the state, the
wisest and the best of her citizens be elected. A second effort is, to communicate
to the operations of government as great a share as possible of the good, and as
small a share as possible of the bad propensities of our nature. A third effort is, to
increase, encourage, and strengthen those good propensities, and to lessen,
discourage, and correct those bad ones. A fourth effort is, to introduce, into the
very form of government, such particular checks and controls, as to make it
advantageous even for bad men to act for the public good. When these efforts are
successful, and happily united; then is accomplished what we truly mean, when
we speak of government of laws, and not of men; then every man does homage to
the laws; the very last as feeling their care; the greatest as not exempted from their
power (Wilson 2007, 695-96).
If representation is true and equal, the people will feel an obligation and obedience toward the
government created by it. Representative government serves as the best tool for the people at
large to have their wants and needs achieved.

Separation of Powers

Another important aspect of derived sovereignty for Wilson is the clear separation of
powers designated in the Constitution. The most important aspect of Wilson’s conception of
separation of powers is the maintenance of clear boundaries between the three branches. Wilson
states:

The independency of each power consists in this, that its proceedings and the
motives, views, and principles, which produce those proceedings should be free
from the remotest influence, direct or indirect, of either of the other two powers.
But further than this, the independency of each power ought not to extend. Its
proceedings should be formed without restraint, but, when they are once formed,
they should be subject to control (Wilson 2007, 707).
Wilson intimates the importance of independency in order to insure that each branch has an
equal amount of authority, therefore legitimizing its use of authority over the people at large.
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However, it is also important to note that without one branch, the other two could not exist due to
the allocation of powers given to each. Wilson states “Between these three great powers of
government, there ought to be a mutual dependency, as well as a mutual independency” (Wilson
2007, 707). This mutual dependency is essential in achieving what the will of the people
designates because it provides checks against the misuse of derived power. Wilson, along with
other Founding Fathers, views the establishment of this system of checks and
balances/separation of powers as introducing a novel idea to the problem of perfecting
government. Hamilton describes the separation of powers in the following terms:

The regular distribution of power into distinct departments; the introduction of
legislative balances and checks; the institution of courts composed of judges
holding their offices during good behavior; the representation of the people in the
legislature, by deputies of their own election; these are either wholly new
discoveries, or have made their principal progress towards perfection in modern
times. They are means, and powerful means, by which the excellencies of
republican government may be retained, and its imperfections lessened or avoided
(Federalist #9, 38).
Wilson attributes the Constitution as the main enforcer of these boundaries. Wilsons states “By
the invigorating and overruling energy of a constitution, the force and direction of the
government are preserved and regulated; and its movements are rendered uniform, strong, and
safe” (Wilson 2007, 712). The existence of the United States Constitution, in its written form,
serves as the ultimate security against power encroachment by the government. This security is
intimated in “Federalist #47,” where Madison describes tyranny as “The accumulation of all
powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many,
and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition
of tyranny” (Federalist #47, 249). The separation of powers between legislative, executive, and
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judiciary, is an effective prevention from tyranny. This is especially true when political power
is allocated along the vertical dimension of federalism.

In addition to the separation of powers between the three branches of government, the
Constitution also places internal checks within each branch of government, to provide more
security to the authority the people hold as principle sovereign. The legislative power, according
to Wilson, must be “absolute, uncontrolled, irresistible, and supreme” (Wilson 2007, 579).
Wilson’s reasoning for this involves the legislative branch’s authority to create law which must
be a reflection of the principled sovereign’s will. Wilson states “the power, which makes the
laws, cannot be accountable for its conduct” (Wilson 2007, 579). Since the law is of upmost
importance to Wilson, it is important that nothing can interfere with the power of creating the
laws. Wilson states “Human laws are nothing else but the decrees of the supreme power,
concerning matters to be observed, by the subjects, for the public good of the state” (Wilson
2007, 579). Laws are created by the agent, Congress, from the derived power of the supreme
power the people, in order to maintain the happiness of the people at large. This ensures the
power of lawmaking to just one branch of government, allowing for clarity and consistency.
Although the power of lawmaking is specifically allocated to the legislative branch, Wilson
emphasizes “the powers of the government, whether legislative or executive, ought to be
restrained” (Wilson 2007, 873). During the Constitutional Convention, Wilson was a strong
supporter of bicameralism. Bicameralism forces members of both houses to create laws that
would best serve the people, and would best abide by the regulations set forth by the
Constitution. Requiring each house to get the approval of the other house in order to pass a bill
into law ensures the bill has been carefully reviewed by both the aristocratic Senate and the
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popularly elected House of Representatives.13 Wilson states “Every bill will, in some one or
more steps of its progress, undergo the keenest scrutiny. Its relations, whether near or more
remote, to the principles of freedom, jurisprudence, and the constitution will be accurately
examined: and its effects upon the laws already existing will be maturely traced” (Wilson 2007,
848). This extra check allows extra security for the people’s wants and preferences. Wilson
states the existence of a bicameral legislature will ensure “their sentiments, and views, and
wishes, and even their passions, will have received a deep and recent tincture from their
sentiments, and views, and wishes, and passions of their constituents” (Wilson 2007, 849). Both
chambers of the national legislature should be open to the public according to Wilson. Wilson
states “the conduct and proceedings of representatives should be as open as possible to the
inspection of those whom they represent, seems to be, in republican government, a maxim, of
whose truth or importance the smallest doubt cannot be entertained” (Wilson 2007, 857). The
checks of bicameralism, frequent elections, and open sessions ensure the legislative branch
maintains its law making power, but does not over-extend its power and encroach on the
authority the people maintain.

Although Wilson supports bicameralism in the legislature, he is not a supporter of a
multiple executive. Wilson believes a single executive is more conclusive to maintaining
boundaries between the three branches of government. Wilson states “the legislature, in order to
be restrained, must be divided; whereas the executive power, in order to be restrained, should be
one” (Wilson 2007, 873). A single executive represents unity, which is attributed with the

13

When the Constitution was originally ratified, only the House of Representatives was popularly elected. The
Senate was originally elected by state legislatures until the passage of the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913 which
allowed for direct election of Senators.
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quality of energy in the executive branch. In “Federalist #70,” Alexander Hamilton describes
energy as a leading characteristic in the definition of good government (Federalist #70, 362). He
states that energy is “essential to the protection of the community against foreign attacks: it is not
less essential to the steady administration of the laws; to the protection of property against those
irregular and high-handed combinations which sometimes interrupt the ordinary course of
justice; to the security of liberty against the enterprises of assaults of ambition, of faction, and of
anarchy” (Federalist #70, 362).

With this conception of energy expressed in The Federalist,

Wilson stresses the necessity of term limits and popular election, as well as electoral election as
placing limits upon the executive power. When discussing the election of the president, he turns
to ancient elections of a supreme ruler. He praises the selection of a King by the old Saxons who
selected their ruler based on merit, instead of heredity. Wilson describes this selection as
democratic, stating “His title rested upon the good opinion of the freemen; and it seemeth to be
one of the best gems of his crown, for that he was thereby declared to be most worthy of the love
and serve of the people” (Wilson 2007, 874). Election upon merit by the people ensures the best
candidate was chosen. However, consistent with his theory on representation, Wilson supports
the existence of an electoral college. Wilson places restrictions on the Electoral College,
mandating they vote by ballot, which he describes as “the silent assertor of liberty: with equal
justness, it may be called the silent assertor of honesty” (Wilson 2007, 876). This process
should, according to Wilson, to be the most effective in securing an effective single executive
that would make the best decisions on behalf of the people.

The last branch, the judicial branch, is of particular interest when studying
Wilson’s political thought. Wilson views the judicial branch as responsible for the
maintenance of boundaries between the three branches of government. The Court cannot
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void what is not contained within its proper sphere. The Court cannot make law.
However, the boundaries of the Court extend to

All cases, in law or equity, arising under the constitution, the laws, or the treaties
of the United States; to all cases affecting public minister and consuls; to all cases
of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies, to which the United
States shall be a party; to controversies between two or more different states;
between citizens of the same state, claiming lands under grants of different states;
and between a state, or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens, or subjects
(Wilson 2007, 895).
In accordance with this jurisdiction, Wilson believes the concept of judicial review is an implicit
power granted to the judicial branch in the creation of the Constitution. However, Wilson views
judicial review as a power granted to the judicial branch that serves as a similar check on both
the executive and legislative branches. Wilson states that “Each house will be cautious and
careful, and circumspect, in those proceedings, which, they know, must undergo the strict and
sever criticism of judges, whose inclination will lead them, and whose duty will enjoin them, not
to leave a single blemish unnoticed or uncorrected” (Wilson 207, 847). If a law passed by
Congress or the states is viewed as unconstitutional, the Court has the power to void the law.
However, the Court cannot void a law on any other authority. Wilson also makes a point to
distinguish the judicial branch as not containing executive power. Wilson states “It is sometimes
considered as a branch of the executive power but inaccurately. When the decisions of courts of
justice are made, they must, it is true, be executed; but the power of executing them is
ministerial, not judicial. The judicial authority consists in applying, according to transactions in
cases, in which the manner or principles of this application are disputed by the parties interested
in them” (Wilson 2007, 703). These checks ensure the Court acts within the boundaries
provided in the Constitution.
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Federalism

Wilson was also a supporter of federalism. Wilson is often attributed as a nationalist,
who wished to demolish state authority all together (see Wilmarth Jr., 2003, 172-184). However,
this is was not Wilson’s intention. Wilson describes federalism as “forming one nation, great
and united; and as forming, at the same time, a number of separate states, to that nation
subordinate, but independent as to their own interior government” (Wilson 2007, 832). For
Wilson, the national government should derive its authority directly from the people rather than
requiring the mediation of the states. Wilson’s idea of the national government containing the
ultimate sovereignty over the states is best exemplified in his opinion in Chisholm v Georgia
(1793). In his opinion, he explains how the state of Georgia, cannot have superiority over their
natural creator, the people. The people, containing the ultimate authority, establish states to
better achieve the ends they desire. According to Wilson, the states were established to “perfect”
an already existing union (Wilson 1785, 66-68). For Wilson and his fellow Founding Fathers,
unity was the central goal in the creation of the United States Constitution. Hamilton explains
the priority of unity as a means of providing security. He states “A firm union will be of the
utmost moment to the peace and liberty of the states, as a barrier against domestic faction and
insurrection” (Federalist #9, 37). Although Wilson and Madison both agree with Hamilton on
the need for unity, they recognize that the Constitution makes specific distinctions between
national power and federal power (Federalist #39, 199). This creates another check against the
encroachment of power by the government.

Conclusion
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According to James Wilson, sovereignty is a multi-dimensional concept. The people
serve as the principle sovereign, from which all power and authority should be derived. The
government serves as the derived sovereign, created and maintained in order to fulfill the wants
and preferences of the people. Wilson states “The dread and redoubtable sovereign, when traced
to his ultimate and genuine sources, has been found, as he ought to have been found, in the free
and independent man. This truth, so simple and natural, and yet so neglected and despised, may
be appreciated as the first and fundamental principle in the science of government” (Wilson
2007, 25) Included in this is the central role of consent. Only through consent can government
be considered legitimate to Wilson.
In order to better understand Wilson’s conception of sovereignty, it is important to
compare his theories with those of his fellow founding fathers. In Power vs. Liberty (2000),
James H. Read compares Wilson and Jefferson on this topic. According to Read, the central
question that needs to be answered in regards to sovereignty is “How is it possible to reconcile
powerful government with the liberty of those subject to its authority” (Read 2000, 90)?
Wilson’s answer is to make the people sovereign. Thomas Jefferson on the other hand, feared
the energetic government that Wilson proposes. According to Read, Wilson is assured that the
people, as sovereign, stand as an effective check and boundary on such encroachment of power
by the government. Central to this disagreement between Jefferson and Wilson is that Jefferson
views the Constitution as creating a nation of sovereign states, where sovereignty is recognized
primarily at the state and local levels (Read 2000, 90). Wilson, however, argues for a more
robust concept of national sovereignty, where the people form the union at the national rather
than state level. Wilson’s concept of energetic government and popular liberty reinforce one
another (Read 2000, 90). According to Wilson, the creation of a federal government with a clear
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separation of powers with internal and external checks and balances creates an energetic
government that is still subject to the will of the people.
Read, however, disagrees with Wilson’s dedication to the people serving as sovereign.
Read instead agrees with Gordon Wood (1998), and Edmund Morgan (1989), that sovereignty is
a mere “fiction,” that the people are tricked into believing in order to legitimize government
(Read 2000, 114-117). Accordingly, Read thinks Wilson was just as easily fooled into believing
the people served as the original authority. Read is incorrect in his study of Wilson. First, it is
important to note that all three of these scholars misinterpret Wilson and his contemporaries by
dismissing the idea of popular sovereignty amongst their political thought. Although historically
popular sovereignty does not appear to exist, it does not mean that the concept of popular
sovereignty is not an important element to Wilson’s political thought. It is also wrong to assume
that Wilson and his contemporaries believed in popular sovereignty as a way of scamming the
people into believing the “fiction” Morgan describes. To Wilson, civic participation and
people’s voice in government is crucial to the success of society. Another issue is that these
scholars are too reliant on the idea of sovereignty as a single dimensional concept. Read
specifically views Wilson as looking at popular sovereignty as a unitary concept. However, as
demonstrated above, Wilson views sovereignty as a multi-dimensional concept, where the
principle-agent relationship between the people and government exists. Like Hobbes, there are
easily identified markers of sovereignty in Wilson’s political and legal thought. This same
model of power is exemplified in the Constitution. These scholars make the mistake of
confusing Wilson’s conception of sovereignty, with his conception of power.
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Given Wilson’s idea of popular sovereignty, it is important to discover its implication for
judges. The position of a judge is to interpret and apply the law to different situations.
However, the job of interpreting is perhaps the most difficult. How a judge should interpret a
specific law is important, because a judge is supposed to be a neutral party. Neutrality is
impossible in human nature. Judges consult extra-constitutional means when deciding cases. In
order to answer this question, it is important to view Wilson’s conception of popular sovereignty
and its implication for judges when making decisions. A judge, being an appointed office, has
no direct link to the people as every other branch of government does. The next chapter will
explore how Wilson’s concept of judicial authority secures this link, and maintains the idea of
the people as principle sovereign.
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Chapter Three: James Wilson on Judges as Agents-Plus

Serving as one of the first members of the United States Supreme Court, Wilson had the
job of shaping the role of a judge, as well as its implications for society and the law based on the
newly adopted Constitution. According to Wilson, a constitution is

that supreme law, made or ratified by those in whom sovereign power of the state
resides, which prescribes the manner, according to which the state wills that
government should be instituted and administered. From this constitution the
power of government must be directed and controlled: of this constitution no
alteration can be made by government; because such an alteration would destroy
the foundation of its own authority (Wilson 2007, 304).
Wilson’s definition of a constitution relies upon the idea of sovereignty as a multi-dimensional
concept, based on a principle-agent relationship. The Constitution is the supreme law. The
people, as principle sovereign make the Constitution, and will their power to the agents of the
government which they have created. These agents are designed to pursue the will of the people,
and limited by the division of powers, and the boundaries set in the Constitution, in order to
prevent tyranny. According to this logic, a judge serves as an agent of the people. A judge is to
represents the wants and interests of the people. However, the nature of a judge cannot be
treated the same as the nature of a representative in Congress. Representatives in Congress are
supposed to be the most accurate voice of the people, with little or no alteration. Judges, on the
other hand, are entrusted with the job of upholding the Constitution, while simultaneously
educating the people on the law. Therefore, they can be considered as Agents-Plus. Judges
serve as both an agent and educator of the principle sovereign, aiding the people in
understanding their position as principle sovereign. Judges help educate the people to make
them better citizens through their decision making and interpretation of the Constitution.
According to Wilson, an educated citizenry is necessary for self-government. With a better
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understanding of their citizenship, the people can direct their efforts towards the perfection of
society, which is what Wilson seeks for the principle-agent relationship of sovereignty to
achieve.

As Agents-Plus, it is important that judges read the Constitution as it was originally
founded, in order to uphold and defend the will of the principle sovereign. It is essential that
judges not interpret the Constitution by societal standards. Through this clarification, judges
protect the Constitution from breaking down. By enforcing the boundaries between the three
branches of government, judges serve as one of the greatest checks on tyranny. Wilson states
“Nothing is more to be dreaded than maxims of law and reasons of state blended together by
judicial authority. Among all the terrible instruments of arbitrary power, decisions of courts;
whetted and guided and impelled by considerations of policy, cut with the keenest edge, and
inflict the deepest and most deadly wounds” (Wilson 2007, 706). The fear of absolute
government and tyranny is why the courts have the job of maintaining boundaries between state
and federal jurisdictions and the three branches of government. Wilson’s use of policy here
indicates that judicial decisions should not be based on political considerations. Decisions
should reflect constitutional principle, which is nothing more than the will of the sovereign
people.
This chapter addresses Wilson’s conception of judges as an Agents-Plus in three different
roles. The first role is as agents. Judges are not to serve as political agents, in order to preserve
the proper balance between the three branches of government. Wilson stresses the importance of
an independent judiciary in completing the duties necessary of judges. Wilson also believes that
as agents, judges should rely on scientific reasoning when making their decisions. The second
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role is as representatives. Wilson designates three jobs to judges as a representative: (1) Not to
make law, but to interpret it in light of the Constitution, (2) To promote a true science of law and
to follow precedent grounded on scientific principles instead of Aristotelian prudence, and (3)
Judicial review must be textually based. The third role is as educators. According to Wilson,
judges have the social responsibility of educating the people (the principle sovereign) through
their judicial decisions. This education not only clarifies the Constitution and the law, but also
serves to educate the people about the nature of their responsibilities as principle sovereign.
Included in this is Wilson’s concept of the moral sentiment, and its relationship with reason (the
science of law). Wilson clarifies this relationship with his idea of judgment and its relationship
with reflection, memory, and reason.

Judges as Agents
Since judges are representatives of the people, it is important that they are independent
from the other branches of government. Wilson argues that the Courts “ought to be completely
independent… They should be removed from the most distant apprehension of being affected, in
their judicial character and capacity, by anything, except their own behavior and consequences”
(Wilson 2007, 704). Important to Wilson is that judges are not political agents. Where the
executive and legislative branches have popularly elected members, either directly or indirectly,
they become political agents that are restrained by the will of the people. This forces political
agents to change their platform according to trends in the general populace. Since Supreme
Court judges are appointed for life, they do not have concern with reelection, and therefore can
make their decisions honestly according to the Constitution. This does not mean that judges are
not agents of the people, it simply means that they are held above the fray of politics, and serve
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only to protect the Constitution, which is the original expression of the people’s will. Wilson
asks:

Can dignity and independence be expected from judges, who are liable to be
tossed about by every veering gale of politics, and who can be secured from
destruction, only by dexterously swimming along with every successive tide of
party? Is there not reason to fear, that in such a situation, the decisions of courts
would cease to be the voice of law and justice, and would become the echo of
faction and violence (Wilson 2007, 704-05)?
The independence of the courts is crucial to maintaining a boundary between not only the three
branches, but between the courts and politics. Since the court is not supposed to be a political
body, its authority and power is very constricted. Hamilton, in “Federalist #78,” describes this
issue stating “The judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over the sword or the purse; no
direction either of the strength or of the wealth of society; and can take no active resolution
whatever. It may truly be said to have neither force nor will, but merely judgment; and must
ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments”
(Federalist #78, 402). The Court’s authority relies upon the Constitution, rather than the current
politics of society. This jurisdiction allows for judges to take on the responsibility of
maintaining the Constitution, and most importantly, maintaining the boundaries between the
three branches.
Maintaining these boundaries is one of the Supreme Court’s most important jobs.
Wilson states “Liberty and security in government depend not on the limits, which the rulers may
please to assign to the exercise of their own powers, but on the boundaries, within which their
powers are circumscribed by the constitution. He who is continually exposed to the lash of
oppression, as well as he who is immediately under it, cannot be denominated free” (Wilson
2007, 705). The enforcement of boundaries ensures that government will not become tyrannical.
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The most important boundary to enforce is between the judicial and the legislative departments.
The legislature creates the law, the judiciary interprets the law. Wilson argues “In consequence
of it, the bounds of the legislative power – a power the most apt to overleap its bounds – are not
only distinctly marked in the system itself; but effectual and permanent provision is made, that
every transgression of those bounds shall be adjudged and rendered vain and fruitless” (Wilson
2007, 743). Using the power of judicial review, the Court can strike down a law if it conflicts
with the Constitution. This allows the judiciary to maintain this boundary between the two
branches. Wilson explains when he states “This regulation is far from throwing any
disparagement upon the legislative authority of the United States. It does not confer upon the
judicial department a power superior, in its general nature, to that of the legislature; but it confers
upon it, in particular instances, and for particular purposes, the power of declaring and enforcing
the superior power of the constitution – the supreme law of the land” (Wilson 2007, 743).
According to Wilson, an act should be declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court if it
violates the spheres of power (on an institutional level), or if it usurps power for the legislature.
In “Federalist #51,” James Madison shares the same sentiment on the maintenance of boundaries
in order to prevent the usurpation of power by another branch. Madison states “the society itself
will be broken into many parts, interests, and classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals, or
of the minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority” (Federalist
#51, 270). One of Madison’s biggest fears was the creation of a majority faction. The division
of power, and the maintenance and enforcement of those divisions prevents against majority
faction, and protects the interests of the minority. The enforcement of boundaries serves to
maintain the Constitution is and always will be the supreme law, in which no branch of
government can infringe upon.
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In the case where the Constitution does not provide clear guidance, or consists of
conflicting protections, judges should be entrusted to make equitable decisions. Wilson relies
upon Aristotle’s definition of equity, which is “the correction of that, in which the law is
defective, by being too general” (Wilson 2007, 924). According to Wilson’s understanding, the
science of law is used to educate a judge on justice and equity. Wilson responds to arguments
calling for separate courts of law and equity by arguing that equity is an inherent aspect and
concern of the law and that the two cannot be separated.1 Wilson critiques the British system,
stating “When we find a court of law and a court of equity placed in contradistinction to each
other, how natural is it to conclude, that the former decide without equity, and that the latter
decides without law. Such a conclusion, however, is greatly erroneous” (Wilson 2007, 925).
He describes the combination of a court of equity and a court of law when interpreting
constitutional issues stating:

It has, indeed, been said, concerning a court of equity, that it determines by the
spirit, and not by the letter of a rule. But ought not this to be said concerning a
court of law likewise? Is not each equally bound – does not each profess itself to
be equally bound – to explain the law according to the intention of those, who
made it? In the interpretation of laws, whether strictly or liberally, there is not a
single maxim, which is not adopted, in the same manner, and with the same force,
by both courts. Hitherto, then, we find no difference between a court of law and a
court of equity (Wilson 2007, 925).
Although others have tried to make the argument that courts of equity and law should remain
separate entities, Wilson does not agree. Wilsons states “law and equity are in a state of
continual progression; one occupying incessantly the ground, which the other, in its
advancement, has left. The posts now possessed by strict law were formerly possessed by
equity; and the posts now possessed by equity will hereafter be possessed by strict law” (Wilson

1

This is a key concern of the Anti-Federalists. See Arkes’ (1990, 21, 23-25) discussion of Brutus.
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2007, 933-34). Here, Wilson appears to separate law and equity on the one hand, and science on
the other. Science is grounded and proven, and informed by reason. This supports the theory of
Hobbes, who believes scientific reasoning should be applied to the law. Hobbes says “reason is
the pace; increase of science, the way; and the benefit of mankind, the end” (Hobbes 1994, 26).
This suggests that both Hobbes and Wilson believe the use of scientific reasoning is the driving
force which should solidify the law, justice and equity. For Wilson, applying scientific
reasoning with equity helps to aid judges in translating the Constitution while simultaneously
improving society. This sentiment is derived from Aristotle as well. Wilson attributes this idea
to Aristotle, stating “equity may be well deemed the conductor of law towards a state of
refinement and perfection” (Wilson 2007, 934). The idea of equity serving as a tool to refining
and perfecting society, also suggests that equity can serve as an end of government and society.
While Wilson attributes the creation of government as the agent for the will of the people, equity
can serve as one of the ends government is designated to achieve.

Judges as Representatives

The second job of judges is to serve as representatives of the will of the people. On this
front, Wilson identifies three important jobs designated for judges. The first is that they should
not make the law (Wilson 2007, 738). Making the law is the job of the legislature. Judges have
only the function of interpreting the law in light of the Constitution. Wilson states “In the United
States, the judges stand upon the sure basis of the constitution: the judicial department is
independent of the legislature” (Wilson 2007, 738). A judge can determine the constitutionality
of the law, and strike it down with the power of judicial review, if and only if it is found to be
unconstitutional. A judge has no other power to strike down a law other than this power,
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limiting their ability to create the law. However, Wilson states “In many cases, the jurisdiction
of the judges of the United States is ascertained and secured by the constitution; as to these, the
power of the judicial is coordinate with that of the legislative department” (Wilson 2007, 738).
The coordination between the legislative branch and the judiciary was of particular importance to
Wilson. Since the judiciary serves as the final check on a new law, judges must coordinate with
lawmakers in order to best serve the needs of society, in accordance with the Constitution.

According to Wilson, however, the Constitution does not provide the necessary means for
coordination. During the Constitutional Convention, Wilson was a strong supporter of a Council
of Revision. A Council of Revision allows judges a broader role in the legislative process, by
giving the federal judiciary a veto power over the legislative branch. The veto would allow the
Court to interject its opinion on a law, before there is ever an issue or case involving that
specified law. For Wilson, The Council of Revision serves a preventative measure, ensuring that
no national law could be unconstitutional. Any bill that would become a law would have to be
approved by a Council of Revision, ensuring that before it becomes a law, it is constitutional.
Wilson thought this power would be safe when, on June 4th 1987, he argues that “this power
would seldom be used. The Legislature would know that such a power existed, and would
refrain from such laws, as it would be sure to defeat. Its silent operation would therefore
preserve harmony and prevent mischief” (Madison 1966, 63). This extra check ensures that the
law would be better, and would therefore create popular attachment to the new government
under the Constitution. Hamilton, in “Federalist #27,” states “confidence in, and their obedience
to, a government will commonly be proportioned to the goodness or badness of its
administration” (Federalist #27, 132). Madison agrees with Hamilton on the need for an
efficacious administration being the key to solving the problem of popular attachment (see
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“Federalist #25-#26,” 122-132; “#46,” 253; and Flaumenhatt, 1992). The Council of Revision
would add efficiency to the national administration and consequently increase popular
attachment to the Constitution and the new national government. According to Wilson, this
would largely be a consequence of the judiciary’s ability to remonstrate “against projected
encroachments on the people as well as themselves” (Madison 1966, 336). According to Wilson,
the Council of Revision would not only solidify the boundaries between the three branches, but
would also serve as a check against the encroachment of the government on the power of the
sovereign people, or attempts to infringe their natural rights.

Despite proposing the Council of Revision on three separate occasions (June 4, July 21, and
August 15, 1787) delegates at the Constitutional Convention ultimately rejected the idea.
According to Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr., the rejection of a Council of Revision serves as a rejection
of Wilson’s conception of popular sovereignty (Wilmarth 2003, 167). The concern with
Wilson’s argument for a Council of Revision is that it would provide judges with too much
authority, effectively inhibiting their ability to decide cases impartially. Moreover, it would blur
or remove the line separating the judicial and legislative departments. However, Wilson was a
strong advocate of maintaining boundary lines, and did not think that empowering the judiciary
with a Council of Revision would endanger them. This would not be consistent with Wilson’s
legal theory. The Council of Revision, in fact, serves as an extension of the judge’s role as an
educator. A Council of Revision allows judges to provide their wisdom and knowledge of the
law to any bill advocated for by the people. Since the legislative branch is popular and has
electoral accountability, Wilson’s fear is that the legislature would be too easily controlled by the
will of the people. Since the people at large are not as educated in the law, Wilson fears laws
supported by the people would be counterproductive to the ends of society. A Council of
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Revision would aid in this education by teaching the people and their elected representatives
what is Constitutional. This clarification would help to educate members of Congress on their
responsibilities as an elected official, and therefore lead to better lawmaking. In addition, it
would allow the people to better understand their role as principle sovereign, therefore perfecting
society.
The second role of judges as representatives is that judges “should implement ‘principles and
rules of genuine policy and natural justice’ for the purpose of promoting a true science of law”
(Wilson 2007, xxiii). According to Wilson, the term “science” is viewed as progress in
reflection of enlightenment principles. For Wilson, the use of precedent is seen as necessary, but
not in every situation. Each new case and new decision improves upon or uses precedent,
almost like a science experiment. In science, a result is only deemed legitimate if it can be
replicated. This is the same for the law. If precedent cannot be applied to more than one case
that is similar in nature, then the decision should be improved upon and changed. Wilson uses
his knowledge of the natural sciences and applies them to the law using the writings of Lord
Francis Bacon.2 Wilson describes the science of law while mentioning the importance of Lord
Bacon in the following:
I think I may venture the position – that in no science can richer materials be
found, and that, in no science, have rich materials been more neglected or abused,
than in the science of law – particularly of the common law. Listen to the
sentiments of my Lord Bacon, in his book on the advancement of learning. It is
well known, that the vast object of this exalted and most comprehensive genius
was, to erect a new and lasting fabric of philosophy, founded, not on hypothesis
or conjecture, but on experience and truth. To the accomplishment of this design,
it was necessary that he should previously review, in all its provinces and

2

On the tension between Bacon and Lord Coke’s understanding of the common law in England see Stoner (1992,
15, 33, 67).
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divisions, the state of learning as it then stood. To do this effectually required
knowledge and discernment, exquisite and universal; such were happily employed
in the arduous task (Wilson 2007, 1026-1027).
The use of science for Wilson is very important in the interpretation, as well as the teaching of
the law. Wilson looks towards the law, as well as the interpretation of it, as an advancement of
learning. Applying the science of law is important to the overall job of judges, because they are
entrusted with clarifying the law of the Constitution for the people. The science of law serves as
a way of improving the existing law, as well as an aid in interpreting what the law intends
through replication. The use of science and the emphasis on replication suggests that through the
use of scientific principles and reason, a judge can better clarify the law, leading to uniformity in
the interpretation of it. If interpretation of the law, and more importantly the Constitution, is
more uniform, it will be easier to educate the people on its meaning. This also supports Wilson’s
idea that the law and its application is universal in nature, which should facilitate, on one hand,
the perfection of society and the cultivation of American citizens, on the other. For example, if
similar laws are interpreted differently in two different states, then two different lessons are
learned by the people. This works against Wilson’s national impulse. Therefore, for Wilson, a
scientific grounding for precedent is surer than the grounding of precedent currently and
historically found in the common law.3

3

Wilson’s emphasis on using scientific principles as a basis for the law serves as a rejection of the idea of the
common law in its traditional formulation. The most common comparison Wilson makes on the common law is that
between the newly created United States Constitution and the government of Great Britain. For one, he notes that in
Great Britain, judges are appointed by the crown. Wilson states, “The judicial department, therefore, does not
depend upon the representation of the people, even in its remotest degree” (Wilson 2007, 721). Without popular
representation, and the existence of a monarchy, it would appear that the Courts of Great Britain have no link to the
people. However, according to Wilson’s conception of the common law, it appears that the common law has an
adaptive quality, allowing it to adapt to the growing needs of the people. Wilson states “The same principle of
accommodation in a system of common law, will adjust its improvement to every grade and species of improvement
made by the people, in consequence of practice, commerce, observation, study and refinement. As the science of
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The science of law also helps to maintain the idea of the judiciary as a pyramid. The
courts, according to Wilson, should resemble a pyramid. Wilson states “Its base should be broad
and spacious: it should lessen as it rises: its summit should be a single point…there should be a
regular, progressive gradation of jurisdiction” (Wilson 2007, 945). The gradation of jurisdiction
provides options, as well as limits them. The higher up the pyramid, the more limited the power
of the court becomes. This is helpful in maintaining the boundaries of the Supreme Court.
Giving the Supreme Court the final authority is potentially dangerous, therefore the pyramid
provides limitations on the court’s power.4 The potential danger is seen in the fact that the court
is not popularly elected, and is not accountable for its decisions. The fear is that an overpowered
court could degenerate into an aristocracy. In addition to this, he states “a supreme court

legislation is the most noble, it is the most slow and difficult of sciences. The jurisprudence of a state, willing to
avail itself of experience, receives additional improvement from every new situation, to which it arrives; and, in this
manner, attains, in the progress of time, higher and higher degrees of perfection, resulting from the accumulated
wisdom of ages” (Wilson 2007, 774). Although its adaptability has led to its perfection in some circumstances, it is
also a troublesome quality. Wilson describes the common law as “nothing else but common reason—that refined
reason which is generally received by the consent of all” (Wilson 2007, 750). Containing the consent of all does not
necessarily legitimize the common law. It is the job of judges to refine the law and educate the people on it so that it
is consistent with pursuing a true science of law and natural justice. Judges have the job of educating the people on
what is right and wrong, but cannot do so through the common law. Wilson states “the rich composition of the
common law is formed from all the different ingredients, which have been enumerated; yet, when we descend to
particular principles and rules, it is very difficult, it is often impossible, to ascertain the particular source, from
which such rules and principles have been drawn” (Wilson 2007, 769). Without being able to identify its source,
attachment to the common law seems improbable. The existence of evidence in science increases the probability of
attachment, because it contains principles that have been tested and proven. The common law does contain
scientific principles for example, as Wilson explains “common law, like natural philosophy, when properly studies,
is a science founded on experiment. The latter is improved and established by carefully and wisely attending to the
phenomena of the material world; the former, by attending, in the same manner, to those of man and society”
(Wilson 2007, 777). However, this describes precedent, in which judges refer to prior decisions and make a new
decision based upon new evidence. Although the common law contains provisions for a solid government, it does
not provide the concreteness a good administration requires when making judicial decisions. The adaptability of the
common law is both a strength and weakness, where the rigidity and consistency of scientific principles will always
remain a strong base for government.
4

This limitation on the Supreme Court’s power is best seen in the case of Marbury v. Madison 1803. In Marbury,
the Supreme Court denied cert because Marbury had filed for original jurisdiction. The Supreme Court only has the
power of appellate jurisdiction, therefore making Marbury’s claim outside the sphere of the Supreme Court’s
jurisdiction.
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prohibits the abuse, and protects the exercise, of every inferior judiciary power” (Wilson 2007,
945). The creation of the United States court system allows for the science of law to function
properly. Each district has its own federal court, and appellate court to which the law is
interpreted and applied. However, the Supreme Court has the ultimate authority, and makes the
ultimate decision of whether or not a decision or law is constitutional.

The third role of a judge as representative is that judicial review should always been text
based (Wilson 2007, xxiii). This should be seen as a limitation. Although the power of judicial
review is an implicit power with the function of ascertaining the validity of a statute, Wilson
limits this implicit power by requiring judge’s decisions involving judicial review to be strictly
text based. Since the Constitution is the supreme law of the land, and is the will of the sovereign
people, Wilson believes it provides the proper criteria for making this determination. Wilson
describes judicial review as:

If the validity of a statute or treaty of the United States, or of an authority
exercised under them, be drawn in question, in any suit in the highest court of law
or equity of a state, in which a decision of the suit could be had; and a decision is
against their validity – if the validity of a statute of any state, or of an authority
exercised under that state, is, in any suit in such court, drawn in question, as
repugnant to the constitution, treaties or laws of the United States; and a decision
is in favor of their validity – if the construction of any clause of the constitution,
of a treaty, of a statute of the United States, or of a commission held under them,
is, in any suit in such court, drawn in question; and a decision is against the title,
right, privilege or exemption, specially set up or claimed by either party under
such clause – a final judgment or decree, in all these cases, may, upon a writ of
error, be reexamined and affirmed or reverse in the supreme court of the United
States (Wilson 2007, 897).
The power of judicial review is used when the Constitution is not clear about a certain issue, or if
there are conflicting principles. Grounding judicial review in text also limits the power of the
Supreme Court from overstepping their jurisdictional boundaries. It also allows for a legitimate
69

check on the acts of the legislature. In recognition of this, Hamilton refers to the judicial branch
as an “intermediate body between the people and the legislature, in order, among other things, to
keep the latter within the limits assigned to their authority” (Federalist #78, 404). Maintaining
the proper balance between the three branches of government constitutes a significant part of a
judge’s responsibilities. A judge wants to promote a true science of law, and reach natural
justice according to Wilson, therefore the power of judicial review works towards that goal, by
refining the wants and needs of the people, by limiting them with the Constitution. Hamilton,
picking up on this point, goes further and says “the interpretation of the laws is the proper and
peculiar province of the courts. A constitution is in fact, and must be, regarded by the judges as
fundamental law. It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning as well as the meaning of
any particular act proceeding from the legislative body” (Federalist #78, 404). Judicial review
stands as the strongest check against legislative encroachment, and aides in the enforcement of
boundaries between these two branches. In order to better understand these boundaries, it is
important to look at the three jobs Wilson designates for judges.

Although a judge is an appointed position, a judge serves as equally a representative as an
elected official. According to Wilson, judges serve as an Agents-Plus, serving as not only an
agent of the will of the people, but also as an educator. Judges are entrusted with the
responsibility to interpret and protect the Constitution, while at the same time, educating the
people on its proper understanding. Wilson designates three jobs to judges. The first, that they
cannot make law, is important to maintaining the boundary between the judiciary and the
legislature. Wilson’s fear of legislative encroachment is seen in his support of a Council of
Revision. However, even in his support of a Council of Revision, judges were seen only as
advisors to provide guidance, using their acquired knowledge of the law, to ensure that all laws
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were beneficial to society and the will of the people. A second job for judges is that they must
promote natural justice through the use of a true science of law. For Wilson, a true science of
law is understood as grounding the law in scientific principles and applying those reasonable
principles to reach the most justifiable decision. Using precedent grounded in these scientific
principles, and not the common law is important to Wilson’s view on judges. The third job of a
judge requiring the grounding of judicial review in text provides limitations, as well as guidance
to judges. Although Wilson agrees that judges use extra constitutional means to make decisions,
the text of the Constitution still stands as the most important tool to interpretation for Wilson.
This restriction maintains the legitimacy of the Constitution, while still allowing for judges to
use other tools in order to answer questions that the Constitution is silent on. Now that the three
jobs of judges have been determined, it is important to view how they put these roles into action.

Judges as Educators
The third most important function of a judge is to serve as an educator of the sovereign
people. Judges are entrusted with this education, because they are seen as knowledgeable
individuals, enlightened by studying the law and what Wilson refers to as the science of law. In
the example that the people ask Congress to do something that is outside the government’s
derived power, or is inconsistent with the ends of government, the Court has the job of
recognizing that this is unconstitutional, and has the job of educating the people on why what
they are asking is inconsistent with the ends of government as designated by the Constitution.
Wilson describes a judge as “He who is qualified to teach, is well qualified to judge; and he, who
is well qualified to judge, is well qualified to teach” (Wilson 2007, 447-48). According to
Wilson, a judge has the social responsibility of bettering society. A judge does this by educating
the people on the law through their decisions.
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When interpreting the Constitution, judges use what Wilson refers to as “common sense”
(Wilson 2007, 819). This “common sense” is informed by Wilson’s concept of the moral
sentiment, which is used to resolve the tension between natural right principles and common law
principles. Wilson states that when making decisions, a judge must “pry into the secret recesses
of the human heart, and become well acquainted with the whole mortal world, that they may
discover the abstract reason of all laws” (Wilson 2007, 458). This implies two important
concepts for Wilson. When he refers to “the secret recesses of the human heart,” he is referring
to the moral sentiment. Wilson states that the moral sentiment “from its very nature, is intended
to regulate and control all our other powers. It governs our passions as well as our actions”
(Wilson 2007, 512). For Wilson, the concept of the moral sentiment is “In short; if we had not
the faculty of perceiving certain things in conduct to be right, and others to be wrong; and of
perceiving our obligation to do what is right, and not to do what is wrong; we should not be
moral and accountable beings” (Wilson 2007, 512). Therefore, according to Wilson, the moral
sentiment serves as our internal check on right and wrong, placed in the hearts of individuals by
God.5

Another way of conceptualizing the moral sense is as conscience. This is an important
quality of a judge, because judges require the proper understanding of right and wrong while
making decisions. According to Wilson, “His conscience or moral sense determines the end,
which he ought to pursue; and he has intuitive evidence that his end is good: but the means of
attaining this end must be determined by reason” (Wilson 2007, 514). Reason is the second part
of Wilson’s understanding of the “common sense,” as well as judicial decision making. Once a

5

This idea coincides with Wilson’s conception of natural rights, natural law, the state of nature, and human nature.
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judge has consulted with the moral sense to determine what is right or just, they must use reason
in order to execute what the moral sense is telling them to do.6 Wilson states “Thus, though
good and ill, right and wrong are ultimately perceived by the moral sense, yet reason assists its
operations, and, in many instances, strengthens and extends its influence” (Wilson 2007, 514).
Reason and the moral sense work together to find the best possible outcome for a situation. The
moral sense cannot act without reason, because reason provides what the moral sense cannot.
Wilson states “reason serves to illustrate, to prove, to extend, to apply what our moral sense has
already suggested to us, concerning just and unjust, proper and improper, right and wrong”
(Wilson 2007, 514), while in addition, “reason contributes to ascertain the exactness, and to
discover and correct the mistakes, of the moral sense… It considers the relations of actions, and
traces them to the remotest consequences” (Wilson 2007, 515). However, this is not to suggest
that reason is superior to the moral sense. According to Wilson, “the ultimate ends of human
actions, can never, in any case, be accounted for by reason” (Wilson 2007, 519). However, the
fault of reason is that it “presents false appearances to our moral sense” (Wilson 2007, 518).
Although it may seem that reasoning can be used to solve an issue in the natural sciences, in the
science of law, the moral sentiment is required. According to Wilson, “the dictates of reason are
neither more general, nor more uniform, nor more certain, nor more commanding, than the
dictates of the moral sense” (Wilson 2007, 517). Therefore, it is important, given the strengths
and weaknesses of both the moral sense and reason separately, that the two work together.
6

A connection here can also be made to Aristotelian deliberation. In Aristotelian deliberation, a goal is identified,
and the method is to work backwards from where you are in order to devise a plan, and then to execute that plan. It
would seem that Wilson placing Aristotle within the scientific foundation of the law identified earlier. In his
Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle describes deliberation as “The one who deliberates in a way described seems to be
inquiring and analyzing just as one would with a geometric diagram” (1112b 20-22). Aristotle also talks about the
issue of unrestrained passions controlling decision making, stating that people who rely on passion after deliberating
about a topic “do no stick to the things they decided by deliberating” (1150b 20-22). For Aristotle and Wilson, the
combination of reasoning and the passions (moral sense) should be use to aid in decision making, but can be
dangerous if used separated.
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According to Wilson’s conception of the moral sense, it would seem that using a pure
science of law if inadequate when making decisions. Wilson believes good judges need the
combination of the science of law and the moral sense in order to arrive at the right decision.
Wilson states “Truth may, indeed, by reasoning, be rendered evident to the understanding; but it
cannot reach the heart, unless by means of the imagination” (Wilson 2007, 469). This suggests
that science is silent on the question of right and wrong. However, the moral sense also cannot
be the only influence on judicial decision making either. Wilson states “Laws may be
promulgated by reason and conscience, the divine monitors within us” (Wilson 2007, 470). Both
coordinate with one another in order to arrive at a just and equitable decision. The moral sense,
without the use of reason appears to have no restrictions. This tension between the moral sense
and the science of law is solved by Wilson’s conception of judgment.
The first important part of Wilson’s conception of judgment is reflection. Wilson
believes that experience, as well as reflection on the experience of others is a very important
influence on judicial decision making. Wilson describes the action of reflection as “By this
power, the mind makes its own operations the subject of its attention, and views and examines
them on every side” (Wilson 2007, 586). While reasoning and the moral sense both used when
making decisions, reflection serves as the best restriction against the passions of the moral sense.
Wilson states “how utterly impossible is it to make any clear and distinct observations on our
faculties of thought, unless the passions, as well as the imagination, be silent and still” (Wilson
2007, 586). Once reflection has restricted the overbearing passions the moral sense can
sometimes present, one can apply the science of law and come to a decision that is consistent
with the dictates of natural justice. Reflection allows for the discovery of truth, and therefore the
right and best answer for a given situation.
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A second component of Wilson’s conception of judgment is the relationship between
judgment and memory. According to Wilson, “Judgments are intuitive, as well as discursive,
founded on truths that are self evident, as well as that are deduced from demonstration, or from
reasoning of a less certain kind. The former, or intuitive judgments, may, in the strictest sense,
be called the judgments of nature” (Wilson 2007, 599). When Wilson refers to demonstration,
he is referring to experience, or memory. According to Wilson, judgment and memory are
mutual assistants. Wilson states “Memory furnishes the materials which judgment selects,
adjusts, and arranges. Those materials selected, adjusted and arranged are more at the call of
memory than before: for it is a well known fact, that those things, which are disposed most
methodically and connected most naturally, are the most distinct, as well as the most lasting
objects of remembrance: hence, in discourse, the utility as well as beauty of order” (Wilson
2007, 597). Without memory, judges would not have the ability to collect and organize
information in a particular case. Memory also allows for reflection, not only on personal
experience, but also on evidence and precedent. Judgment uses memory in order to make
affirmative or denial distinctions. This ability is keen when relying upon the moral sense for a
scale of right and wrong. Wilson describes judgment as “an important operation of the mind;
and it is employed upon the material of perception and knowledge. It is generally described to
be, that act of the mind, by which one thing is affirmed or denied of another” (Wilson 2007,
599). However, he believes this definition is too limited, while at the same time too extensive.
Wilson sees judgment as limited, because it can only be expressed by either affirmation or
denial. There is no true gray area. He believes it is too extensive because it includes testimony
as a conjuncture to judgment, when they are two completely different concepts with different
implications. Judgment, in addition to memory, requires reasoning in order to function.
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The third component of judgment for Wilson is the connection between judgment and
reason. Wilson states that “with the power of judging, the power of reasoning is very neatly
connected” (Wilson 2007, 600). Wilson sees judgment and reasoning as corresponding with one
another in order to reach the right decision. This coincides with Aristotle’s practical judgment
(1142a-1142b). According to Wilson, “reasoning is strictly the process, by which we pass from
one judgment to another, which is the consequence of it. In all reasoning, there must be one
proposition, which is inferred, and another, at least, from which the inference is made” (Wilson
2007, 600). Reasoning is the bridge between memory and judgment. Reasoning allows for
judgment to make the necessary connections, and helps to organize and analyze the information
contained within memories. This organization allows for a judge to think about memories in a
restrained form. This restrained form is less likely to be overly passionate, and can aid a judge in
his/her decision making in a clear and logical sense. However, Wilson points out that “reason,
as well as judgment, has truth and falsehood for its objects: both proceed from evidence; both are
accompanied with belief” (Wilson 2007, 600). Therefore, according to Wilson, reasoning and
judgment cannot stand alone. Both have the ability to reach the wrong conclusion. Wilson’s
solution to this is the moral sense. Wilson states “Our knowledge of moral philosophy, of
natural jurisprudence, of the law of nations, must ultimately depend, for its first principles, on the
evidence and information of the moral sense” (Wilson 2007, 803). The combination of the moral
sense with judgment and reason is very important in understanding and interpreting the
Constitution. According to Wilson, the Constitution contains common sense moral principles
(Wilson 2007, 615). The Constitution does not explicitly state these principles, but it is required
of a judge to identify them using reason. One of the strongest common sense moral principles
contained within the Constitution is the protection of the innocent. Wilson states “the moral
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sense restrains us from harming the innocent: it teaches us, that the innocent have a right to be
secure from harm. These are two great principles, which prepare us for society; and with regard
to them, the moral sense discovers peculiar inflexibility: it dictates, that we should submit to any
distress or danger, rather than procure our safety and relief of violence upon an innocent person”
(Wilson 2007, 627-628). The Constitution deals with common sense moral principles in a
limited approach. It places restraints upon individuals in society through the use of a common
sense. Each individual has a common, moral sentiment that tells them what is right and wrong
placed in them by God. The Constitution, as well as the governmental institutions it creates, is
intended to inform the people on this moral sentiment, and aid them in discovering it. The
Constitution cannot simply be looked at as the will of the people, but as the will of the people
that embodies and presumes and argument on certain moral principles.
Important to Wilson’s theory of judgment is the relationship between reason and common
sense. According to Wilson, philosophy has a tendency to extent reason beyond its natural
limits. Wilson states:

The defects and blemishes of the received philosophy, which have most exposed
it to ridicule and contempt, have been chiefly owing to a prejudice of the votaries
of this philosophy in favor of reason. They have endeavored to extend her
jurisdiction beyond its just limits; and to call before her bar the dictates of
common sense. But these will not submit to this jurisdiction: they plead to its
authority; and disdain its trial; they claim not its aid; they dread not its attacks
(Wilson 2007, 615).
Reason on its own cannot be used to make right and just decisions. When reason is extended
beyond its proper sphere, it can pervert the dictates of right and wrong. According to Wilson,
when reason is extended beyond its proper sphere it can enslave an individual. In order to ensure
reason remains within its proper sphere, Wilson adds common sense to the equation. Wilson
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argues “In this unequal contest between reason and common sense, the former will always be
obliged to retreat both with loss and with dishonor; nor can she ever flourish, till this rival ship is
dropt, till these encroachments are given up, and till a cordial friendship is restored. For, in truth,
reason has no other root than the principles of common sense: it grows out of them: and from
them it draws its nourishment” (Wilson 2007, 615). In order for the relationship to work, reason
must feed off of the first principles established within individuals by God, presented by the
common sense. Common sense provides the normative standards of natural law and natural
right needed to create a just society. Reason must be representative of first principles, if
common sense is to be interpreted and understood within its proper sphere. Wilson states “We
assign reason to two offices, or two degrees. The first is, to judge of things self evident. The
second is, from self evident principles, to draw conclusions, which are not self evident. The first
of these is the province, and the sole province, of common sense, and, therefore, in its whole
extent, it coincides with reason; and is only another name for one branch or one degree of
reason” (Wilson 2007, 604). This relationship between reason and common sense is essential to
keeping reason within its proper sphere, and allowing for effective reflection on first principles.

Discussion
Having distilled Wilson’s theory of how judges make decisions, it can now be placed
alongside the other schools of thought.

Although each has similar qualities to Wilson’s

thought, each has significant differences as well. The first school is the natural law. According
to the natural law, law and morality cannot be divorced from one another. The natural law also
provides principles for how one ought to live, based on substantive moral reasoning that defines
right and wrong. The natural law is universal, but not in the same sense as Wilson understands
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universally. Arkes (1990) and George (2001) attempt to incorporate Thomistic natural law
principles into a theory of jurisprudence, where Wilson grounds a theory of jurisprudence on
scientific principles. Since the natural law argument focuses on the Thomistic idea of right and
wrong, Wilson does not fit within its confines. Wilson believes that God has placed within each
individual the dictates of right and wrong, he uses common sense, the moral sentiment, and
reasoning rather than a strict reliance on the divine. Wilson focuses on the common sense,
reaching inside ourselves for the dictates of morality. The traditional natural law argument, in
contrast, argues that the source of natural law is external to man, in the form of a divine God.
Where Wilson focuses on scientific reasoning, in addition to the moral sense, the natural law
argument only focuses on the external dictates of their divine natural law. For Wilson, the
natural law does not provide a thorough basis for decision making, but instead creates a very
limited understanding of right and wrong based on divine reasoning.
Interpretation of the Constitution also poses a tension between Wilson’s thought and
natural law. Arkes (1990) and Wilson both agree that the Constitution should be considered first
when making judicial decisions. Arkes critiques modern jurisprudence, claiming that modern
day judges mold the Constitution to their argument. Wilson would agree with the critique, given
that the Constitution is the supreme law, and should be the final word on a given topic. Arkes
also argues that The Constitution presents abstract moral principles in which individuals are to
follow, therefore allowing for a broader interpretation. Arkes would allow for broader
interpretation as long as it is consistent with his view of natural law. Wilson would agree that
abstract moral principles are embedded in the Constitution, but does not agree with a loose
interpretation of it. Wilson believes the Constitution should be read according to the text, and
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should only use extra-constitutional means where the Constitution is either ambiguous or silent.
Therefore Wilson’s political thought does not fit wholly within the natural law interpretive camp.

The second school is of natural right. According to natural rights theorists, if a law is
against natural rights, judges should reject it as the government has the job of protecting the
inalienable rights of individuals. Natural rights theorists also believe that legitimacy in
government is gained by the proper protection of rights, not the consent of the governed. Barnett
states “a duty to obey the law cannot be grounded on the consent of the governed when there has
been anything less than unanimous consent and that, obviously, no government legal system can
claim this degree of consent” (Barnett 2004, 30). According to the natural rights argument, the
job of government is to secure individual rights, unless everyone, unanimously, can all agree that
government does not have the means to execute a given action. Barnett goes on to claim that the
phrase “We the People,” is a fiction, as well as the idea of popular sovereignty itself. This idea is
in direct tension with Wilson’s idea of popular sovereignty. Wilson’s political thought focuses
heavily on the importance of consent, as well as the people as principle sovereign. Wilson
agrees that the government, as an agent of the people, and as part of their social responsibility
should protect individual’s natural rights and improve society. This implies a trust between the
sovereign people that the government will actively protect their natural rights. For Wilson, the
government is simultaneously empowered and limited by this trust. For Barnett and other
natural rights theorists, the government is limited.

Natural rights theorists also believe that

popular attachment is based on what an individual’s conscience dictates. If an individual
believes a law, or the government is not protecting them properly, they have the right to
deny/disobey that law. Wilson would disagree with this concept of political attachment, given
the multiple provisions provided in the Constitution to ensure that the laws created and passed by
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the legislature will be good laws. However, Wilson would agree that conscience is a necessary
factor in determining right and wrong. Wilson’s moral sentiment, based on common sense
principles provides guidance on right and wrong, in the same way individual conscience does.

The third school is of the common law in America. According to Stoner (1992), the
common law requires judges to make decisions using prudence and precedent. A heavy reliance
on precedent allows for judges to make decisions based on the prior decisions of other judges,
while accounting for new evidence presented within a case. Wilson agrees with the use of
precedent, but does not place a heavy reliance upon it. The common law is adaptable, changing
with each generation to fit the needs of the people. The common law is unwritten, therefore
allowing for flexibility. For Wilson, the common law does not provide a solid basis for judicial
decision making. Instead, Wilson favors grounding the Constitution and its interpretation on
scientific principles. Science is proven. The common law is dynamic and unstable. Although
the common law has been perfected over time, science allows for replication. The common law
does not rely on scientific reasoning, and is therefore nonreplicable. This creates tension within
the law, and therefore a problem with popular attachment to the law. This tension is commonly
seen within interstate law. If a given action is legal in one state, but illegal in another, the people
can become confused, therefore damaging popular attachment to that law. In addition, if
conflicting messages are being sent by the law, it is in effect undermining the ability of the
sovereign people to perform their responsibilities. If the law is universal, and grounded on
scientific principles, it will be more solidified, and therefore the people will be more likely to
consent to it.
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Wilson’s position on judicial decision making blends natural law and natural rights
principles, based on a scientific grounding of the law. Wilson’s science of law is ultimately a
scientifically informed understanding of precedent and judicial reasoning. Where the three
competing interpretations of how judges should decide go wrong is in viewing the act of decision
making as having to fall exclusively into a single intellectual camp. This requirement is
inconsistent with what is generally regarded as the fundamental starting point to the study of
American political thought. A single body of philosophy cannot accurately explain or describe
American political thinking as Americas draw on multiple, often contradicting, intellectual
traditions (Gibson 2007, 130-164; Gibson 2006, 7-63). Wilson’s multi-dimensional concept of
popular sovereignty, as well as his understanding of what judges should have recourse to when
making decisions serves as the perfect example of how multiple influences affect the political
thought of our Founding Fathers.
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Chapter Four: Ronald Dworkin and The Moral Reading
As previously stated, the question of “How judges should make decisions” is a
controversial one. Having reviewed the three other schools of constitutional interpretation and
identified James Wilson’s theory of how judges are to make decisions, it is important to consider
the theory of Ronald Dworkin. Where the other three schools attempt to restrict the role and
discretion of a judge, Dworkin seems to expand it by allowing judges to consult moral principles
not necessarily found in the Constitution. This expansion is what links Dworkin’s theory of
interpretation to Wilson’s theory. According to Dworkin, judges must have recourse to his
theory of the moral reading, a value based theory of constitutional interpretation. Based on this
theory, judges should articulate a theory of a given concept, such as equality or liberty, in a way
that is consistent with his or her view of dignity. He emphasizes the importance of interpretation
of these concepts, the source of which is the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. Using his idea
of dignity, judges are to apply a latent set of moral principles to help them better understand
these concepts.
However, judges will not admit to using such practices, in order to maintain the
reputation for neutrality and independence. Dworkin recognizes this, stating “But it would
indeed be revolutionary for a judge openly to recognize the moral reading, or to admit that it is
his or her strategy of constitutional interpretation, and even scholars and judges who come close
to recognizing it shrink back and try to find other, usually metaphorical, descriptions of their
own practice. There is therefore a striking mismatch between the role of the moral reading
actually places in American constitutional life and its reputation” (Dworkin 1996, 3). Although
it seems implausible, Dworkin believes judges should be more honest about what guides them in
their decision making. He believes judges should not be so concerned with appearing neutral,
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seeing that human nature does not allow one to make decisions impartially. Dworkin argues
instead “Judicial independence does not consist in justices having no previous opinions about the
issues that come before them but in their willingness to attend carefully and honestly to
arguments on both sides, and to be ready to change their minds if convinced” (Dworkin 1996,
310). Impartiality is only a small role of a judge according to Dworkin. A judge that has the
ability to review a case, reflect on precedent, and be able to make a valid argument for his/her
decision is what is important to Dworkin. Dworkin uses the example of Justice Thomas’
nomination to the Supreme Court to explain why the neutrality thesis is not valid. He states:
‘the neutrality thesis’: that a Supreme Court justice can reach a decision in a
difficult constitutional case by some technical legal method that wholly insulates
his decision from his own basic convictions about political fairness and social
justice. The thesis does not insist only that a justice can set aside his own interest,
in reaching decisions, as of course he can and must. It also insists that justices
can reach decisions uninfluenced by their own convictions about fundamental
issues of political and constitutional philosophy (Dworkin 1996, 313).
Dworkin’s moral reading rejects the neutrality thesis, on the grounds of human nature and
his view of how judges make decisions.
In this chapter I will examine Ronald Dworkin’s theory of constitutional
interpretation, the moral reading. In order to do this, it is important to review Dworkin’s
general theory of interpretation. According to Dworkin, his value based theory of
interpretation trumps any other existing theory. Then I will discuss how this value based
theory is the basis of Dworkin’s rejection of the majoritarian premise. Dworkin rejects
the majoritarian premise with his concept of dignity. Next I will look at the moral theory
in practice by looking at what methodology Dworkin wishes for judges to employ when
making decisions. Then I will turn to Dworkin’s rejection of originalism by comparing
his abstract moral reading to that of Robert Bork, a staunch originalist. I will then
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conclude this chapter with a rejoinder, comparing Dworkin’s moral reading with James
Wilson’s concept of grounding the law on scientific principles in coordination with the
moral sense.
Dworkin’s Moral Reading
Dworkin offers his theory of the moral reading as a response to the question of “How
judges should make decisions?” According to Dworkin, the moral reading is a tool that judges
have recourse to when making decisions. The moral reading is the application of the abstract
moral principles that can be found in the Constitution to a given legal question or problem.
Dworkin states “the moral reading therefore brings political morality into the heart of
constitutional law” (Dworkin 1996, 2). Dworkin describes the idea of political morality as
“having a tree structure: law is a branch of political morality, which is itself a branch of a moral
general personal morality, which is in turn a branch of a yet more general theory of what it is to
live well” (Dworkin 2011, 5). This idea of morality is central to Dworkin’s theory. Many
scholars have offered critiques of the moral reading, stating that it “give[s] judges absolute
power to impose their own moral convictions on the public” (Dworkin 1996, 2), or that “it allows
one to inject one’s own moral philosophy into the Constitution without abandoning a claim of
textual fidelity” (Jacobsohn 1985, 416). However, the moral theory does not allow judges to
apply their own personal convictions, but instead gives judges the task of recognizing these
abstract moral principles, inherent in the text of the Constitution, and applying them to a given
legal question or problem. Dworkin states “the best explanation of the differing patterns of their
decisions lies in their different understandings of central moral values embedded in the
Constitution’s text” (Dworkin 1996, 2). Scholars may find fault in this because it affects the
neutrality of judges, making them political figures, opposed to legal experts. However, Dworkin
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argues “The moral reading is not, in itself, either a liberal or a conservative charter or strategy”
(Dworkin 1996, 3). For Dworkin, a judge serves as more of a “Philosopher King,” whose
knowledge of the truth and morality allows him/her to arrive at a morally responsible decision.1
Dworkin further clarifies this argument stating “Judges may not read their own convictions into
the Constitution. They may not read the abstract moral clauses as expressing any particular
moral judgment, no matter how much that judgment appeals to them, unless they find it
consistent in principle with the structural design of the Constitution as a whole, and also with the
dominant lines of past constitutional interpretation by other judges” (Dworkin 1996, 10).
Although scholars argue that the moral reading gives judges too much power, Dworkin argues
the moral reading has limitations.
One of these limitations involves Dworkin’s concept of interpretation. Dworkin states
“Morality as a whole, and not just political morality, is an interpretive enterprise” (Dworkin
2011, 12). According to Dworkin, “our moral judgments are interpretations of basic moral
concepts, and we test those interpretations by placing them in a larger framework of value to see
whether they fit with and are supported by what we take to be the best conception of other
concepts” (Dworkin 2011, 12). Interpretation of value is key to a judge in exercising moral
responsibility, according to Dworkin’s model. This moral responsibility enables judges to place
filters on their own personally held convictions, and apply a morally grounded interpretation to a
given legal question. Dworkin states “our moral responsibility requires us to try to make our
reflective convictions into as dense and effective a filter as we can and in that way to claim as
much force as possible for conviction within the more general causal matrix of our personal

1

Dworkin adopts the idea of a “Philosopher King” from Plato’s Republic. A “Philosopher King” has all of the
qualities necessary to protect the laws and institutions of the state, because of their attraction to knowledge and truth,
as well as embodying a gentle and temperate nature. See Plato’s The Republic Book VI, 484a-502c and 502c-511d.
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history as a whole. This requires that we seek a thorough coherence of value among our
convictions” (Dworkin 2011, 108). The ability to effectively filter one’s own personally held
beliefs, in order to apply a morally responsible thought process are they key factors in creating
an effective framework in which judicial decisions are to be based. Dworkin states “we must
construct a larger structure of different kinds of value into which a conception of rationality fits –
a structure that justifies a particular conception or understanding of what it is to have a reason”
(Dworkin 2011, 51). This framework is meant to create a comprehensive theory of moral
interpretation, therefore bringing unity to the value inherent in these concepts, which are
“interconnected and mutually supporting” (Dworkin 2011, 10). Dworkin further supports the
idea of applying a value based theory of constitutional interpretation by applying Hume’s
principle. Dworkin summarizes Hume’s principle stating “no series of propositions about how
the world is, as a matter of scientific or metaphysical fact, can provide a successful case on its
own – without some value judgment hidden in the interstices – for any conclusion about what
ought to be the case” (Dworkin 2011, 44). Hume’s principle explains that any argument has
moral value attached to it, thereby necessitating a decision influenced by these moral values. No
topic or argument can be separated from these moral values. In order to better understand the
value theory in practice, it is important to look at Dworkin’s rejection of the majoritarian
premise.
Rejecting the Majoritarian Premise
Dworkin identifies a critique which speaks to the inspiration of the moral premise. He
states:
Constitutional scholars often say that we must avoid the mistakes of both the
moral reading, which gives too much power to judges, and of originalism, which
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makes the contemporary Constitution too much the dead hand of the past. The
right method, they say, is something in between which strikes the right balances
between protecting essential individual rights and deferring to popular will. But
they do not indicate what the right balance is, or even what kind of scale we
should use to find it. They say that constitutional interpretation must take both
history and the general structure of the Constitution into account as well as moral
or political philosophy. But they do not say why history or structure, both of
which, as I said, figure in the moral reading, should figure in some further or
different way, or what that different way is, or what general goal or standard of
constitutional interpretation should guide us in seeking a different interpretive
strategy (Dworkin 1996, 14).
The moral reading serves as an alternative to the majoritarian premise stated in the above quote.
Dworkin ultimately rejects the majoritarian premise based upon his concept of dignity.
Dworkin’s concept of dignity has two defining principles. The first principle is “you must treat
the success of your own life as a matter of objective importance” (Dworkin 2011, 255). The
second principle is “authenticity, assigns each of us a personal responsibility to act consistently
with the character and projects he identifies for himself” (Dworkin 2011, 261). Applying these
two principles of dignity, Dworkin identifies the conditions of moral membership. The first
condition is “each person must have an opportunity to make a difference in the collective
decisions, and the force of his role” (Dworkin 1996, 24). Dworkin is a strong supporter of
individual rights, and it is important that each individual has a choice in deciding what happens
in his or her own life. Dworkin applies the first principle of dignity in the creation of this
condition. He states “your reason for thinking it objectively important how your life goes is also
a reason you have for thinking it important how anyone’s life goes: you see the objective
importance of your life mirrored in the objective importance of everyone else’s” (Dworkin 2011,
260). The majoritarian premise denies this, forcing individuals to agree with the wants and
needs of the majority, restricting their own individual rights and freedoms. Rather than viewing
their decision making within the scope of morality to determine the best interest of their own
lives and the community, they are compelled by majority opinion. Dworkin rejects the
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majoritarian premise with his own conception of democracy along the lines of moral
membership, stating “it denies that it is a defining goal of democracy that collective decisions
always or normally be those that a majority or plurality of citizens would favor if fully informed
and rational. It takes the defining aim of democracy to be a different one: that collective
decisions be made by political institutions whose structure, composition, and practices treat all
members of the community as individuals, with equal concern and respect” (Dworkin 1996, 17).
By allowing each individual member to reflect on moral principles, the law will be made with
recourse to those moral principles, and better protect the individual rights and freedoms of
citizens. Dworkin emphasizes this stating:
A political community has no moral power to create and enforce obligations
against its members unless it treats them with equal concern and respect; unless,
that is, its policies treat their fates as equally important and respect their
individual responsibilities for their own lives. That principle of legitimacy is the
most abstract source of political rights. Government has no moral authority to
coerce anyone, even to improve the welfare or well-being or goodness of the
community as a whole, unless it respects those two requirements person by
person. The principles of dignity therefore state very abstract political rights: they
trump government’s collective policies (Dworkin 2011, 330).
Therefore, it is the individual moral responsibility of citizens to determine what is right
for their own lives. Government, whether through coercion or majority pressure, should
not be the determinant of how people should live their lives. If it were so, the basic
principles of democracy would be diminished.
The second condition of moral membership is “the political process of a genuine
community must express some bona fide conception of equal concern for the interests of all
members, which means that political decisions that affect the distribution of wealth, benefits, and
burdens must be consistent with equal concern for all” (Dworkin 1996, 25). Here, Dworkin’s
idea of society departs from that of the Founding Fathers. Dworkin believes in a society
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dedicated to equality, where the Founders were dedicated to a commercial society (Federalist
#34, 164). Dworkin further explains this conception stating “Moral membership involves
reciprocity: a person is not a member unless he is treated as a member by others, which means
that they treat the consequences of any collective decisions for his life as equally significant a
reason for or against the decision as are comparable to the consequences for the life of anyone
else” (Dworkin 1996, 25). Dworkin’s concept of equality is directly connected with the first
principle of dignity. He states “nothing could be a plainer violation of the first principle of
dignity than acts that exhibit blatant prejudice – assumption of supposed superiority of one caste
over another or of believers over infidels or Aryans over Semites or whites over blacks”
(Dworkin 2011, 336). His understanding of prejudice applies universally. According to
Dworkin, a governing body can only be legitimate if it applies its rules equally to all. Dworkin
goes further to say that even a coercive government is legitimate only when it “attempts to show
equal concern for the fates of all those it governs and full respect for their personal responsibility
for their own lives” (Dworkin 2011, 352). If government is based upon the two principles of
dignity, it is legitimate according to Dworkin.
The third condition of moral membership is “moral independence, the idea that individual
freedom is furthered by self governance… Individual decisions inevitably affect shared
collective values” (Dworkin 1996, 94). By considering Dworkin’s conditions for moral
membership, and a society based on equality, it is clear the majoritarian premise does not work
in practice. Each individual having the opportunity to reflect on the law and rules that guide
them will be able to have a more informed opinion about the efficiency of that rule of law. This
is also further supported by Dworkin’s first concept of dignity. Applying this, Dworkin believes
that judges make decisions based on their own individual reflection upon the law, and do not
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follow the political trends of the majority. Dworkin concludes his theory on moral membership
in society, stating “a genuine political community must therefore be a community of independent
moral agents. It must not dictate what its citizens think of independent moral agents. It must not
dictate what its citizens think about matters of political or moral or ethical judgment, but must,
on the contrary, provide circumstances that encourage them to arrive at beliefs on these matters
through their own reflective and finally individual conviction” (Dworkin 1996, 26). This idea is
further supported by Dworkin’s second principle of dignity, applied in the framework of natural
rights. Dworkin states “that individuals have a personal responsibility to define success in their
own lives. That principle supports the traditional liberal rights of free speech and expression,
conscience political activity, and religion that most human rights documents include” (Dworkin
2011, 336). These ideals can be found in the government of the United States. Dworkin
commonly references the Bill of Rights to apply the idea of setting out abstract moral principles
in the vague language of the Constitution, stating that the Bill of Rights “construct the
constitutional skeleton of a society of citizens both equal and free” (Dworkin 1996, 73), by
providing a list of rights entitled to the people.
In the application of the two principles of dignity, Dworkin restricts the legitimacy of
government to its ability to embody these two principles. In this, Dworkin hopes to reject the
opinion that liberty and equality are conflicting values, and hopes to instead define them together
as “not only compatible but as intertwined” (Dworkin 2011, 331). Understanding the idea of the
value theory of constitutional interpretation, it is important to view in the next section how the
moral reading works in practice.
The Moral Reading in Practice
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When interpreting the United States Constitution, Dworkin argues that judges should
apply a moral reading to the text in order to establish its meaning. Dworkin believes the moral
reading’s application of law “brings morality into the heart of constitutional law” (Dworkin
1996, 2), and arrives at what is closest to a “right” answer in legal questioning. However, many
have argued against Dworkin’s moral reading theory claiming that it provides too much authority
to judges to “impose their own moral convictions on the public” (Dworkin 1996, 2). Dworkin
argues against these critics, by establishing two important restraints the moral reading places on
individual judges. The first is that “constitutional interpretation must begin with what the
framers said,” and the second is “constitutional interpretation is disciplined under the moral
reading by the requirement of constitutional integrity” (Dworkin 1996, 10).
Dworkin’s First Restraint
When Dworkin mentions the first important restraint “what the framers said,” he is not
referring to the conception of originalism. Originalists believe that Dworkin’s fundamental
moral theory provides too much expansion to the words of the Framers, and provides false
intentions through the interpretation of judges. Fans of the “living Constitution” theory argue the
opposite, stating that “the Constitution is incomplete or open-ended, so that judges have no
choice but to expand its provisions to meet new cases” (Dworkin 1996, 289). Dworkin offers
another argument, referring to the moral reading as a midpoint between originalist thought and
the idea of a “living constitution.” Dworkin makes the claim that “Originalism insists that it
means what they expected their language to do,” and that “According to Originalism, the great
clauses of the Bill of Rights should be interpreted not as laying down the abstract moral
principles they actually describe, but instead as referring, in a kind of code or disguise, to the
framer’s own assumptions and expectations about the correct application of those principles”
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(Dworkin 1996, 13). It is difficult for Dworkin to agree with the originalist strategy because it is
too restrictive in its application (further explanation of Dworkin’s view on originalism can be
found in his argument against Bork). Dworkin’s view on the Framers’ intentions in the creation
of the Constitution is that “They intended to commit the nation to abstract principles of political
morality” (Dworkin 1996, 294), by using “ broad and abstract language appropriate to that aim”
(Dworkin 1996, 272). Dworkin analogizes his theory with that of a father (the Framers) and his
children (the people of the United States) providing instructions to his children. Dworkin states:
Suppose I [as that sagacious father] tell my children simply that I expect them not
to treat others unfairly. I no doubt have in mind examples of the conduct I mean
to discourage, but I would not expect that my “meaning” was limited to these
examples for two reasons. First, I would expect my children to apply my
instructions to situations I had not and could not have thought about. Second, I
stand ready to admit that some particular act that was fair when I spoke was in
fact unfair, or vice versa, if one of my children is able to convince me of that
later; in that case I should want to say that my instructions covered the case he
cited, not that I had changed my instructions. I might say that I meant the family
be guided by the concept of fairness, not by any specific conception of fairness I
might have had in mind (Dworkin, 1977, 134).
According to Dworkin, it is unrealistic to believe that the Founders intended for us to interpret
the Constitution as strict restrictions, but rather as guidelines for the people to follow in order to
achieve Dworkin’s idea of morality. When the Constitution was crafted, it was with the
intention to endure for a long period of time. The Framers knew that as technology developed
and as the Constitution lasted through various generations, the knowledge they had would
become outdated. Therefore, Dworkin’s theory seems very possible. The Framers, knowing the
knowledge of the future was unattainable to them, wanted to create a governing doctrine that
would be able to outlast multiple generations. In order to do this, the language could not be
overly specific, and would need to rely on the moral principles in which Dworkin is suggesting,
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in order to do this. This is why Dworkin does not support the theory of a “living constitution”
either, because it would destroy the integrity of the law the Constitution provides. Therefore,
Dworkin makes the argument for judicial activism, in which judges individually apply the moral
reading of the Constitution to a given situation in order to arrive at the best answer to the legal
question, while also protecting the integrity of the law by referring to precedent, and in the
absence of precedent with a rational interpretation of the principle in question. Dworkin
summarizes this idea by stating “The Constitution enacts abstract principles that judges must
interpret, as best they can, according to their own lights” (Dworkin 1996, 299). Judges must
reflect on the moral judgments reflected in the Constitution, regardless of whether or not it is
what they believe in, and make their decision based on that interpretation. This therefore places
a restriction on judges, so they are applying the moral reading to the Constitution, and not simply
enforcing their own beliefs on a given situation in order to create law that would be beneficial to
that personal or political view. According to Dworkin, the job of a judge is to “find a solution
that respects both the reigning principles of equal concern and personal responsibility, and we
must try to do this in a way that comprises neither principle but rather finds attractive
conceptions of each that fully satisfy both” (Dworkin 2011, 3). By applying the principles of
dignity to their decisions, judges will arrive at a morally responsible decision.
Dworkin’s Second Restraint
The second restraint the moral reading places on judges is the requirement of
constitutional integrity. In order for judges to make a rational-based decision on a given case,
they must refer to precedent, as well as uphold the integrity of previous decisions. Dworkin
explains the use of integrity as a restraint on unruly judicial power stating “I emphasize these
constraints of history and integrity, because they show how exaggerated is the common
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complaint that the moral reading gives judges absolute power to impose their own moral
convictions on the rest of us” (Dworkin 1996, 11). Dworkin describes integrity in several
dimensions in accordance with the law. The first dimension is that integrity “insists that judicial
decision be a matter of principle, not compromise or strategy or political accommodation”
(Dworkin 1996, 11). This first dimension is closely related to the first restraint of relating back
to the words of the Founding Fathers. It is important that we try to interpret what they intended
for us in order to understand what the Constitution should be interpreted as for contemporary
society. The second dimension of integrity “holds vertically: a judge who claims a particular
right of liberty as fundamental that his claim is consistent with the bulk of precedent, and with
the main structures of constitutional arrangement”(Dworkin 1996, 11). By looking towards
precedent as a guide for future decision making, the law gains its legitimacy. If each individual
judge were to decide a case based on circumstances not grounded in history and integrity, then
the law would lose its authority. By keeping the law consistent, the law ensures citizens that
what the law protects will be secured. The third dimension of integrity “holds horizontally: a
judge who adopts a principle must give full weight to that principle in other cases he decides or
endorses” (Dworkin 1996, 11). This dimension is very similar to the second dimension. If a
judge decides that a fetus is not a constitutional person in the instance of a case on abortion
rights, it cannot then decide another case where the fetus is considered a constitutional person. A
judge must remain consistent with their interpretation of what the Constitution provides as an
answer to a multiplicity of legal questions. This is consistent with Dworkin’s idea of equality.
A judge must apply moral principles equally to all cases. This further preserves the integrity of
the Constitution.
Dworkin on Originalism
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To better understand Dworkin’s theory in practice, it is important to understand
originalism, one of the main opponents to Dworkin’s theory. Dworkin’s moral reading theory
offers an alternative to originalism. Robert Bork, a strong supporter of originalism, has been
known by many critics to have a radical view on constitutional interpretation. He is a believer in
textualism, and focusing on original intent.2 Robert Bork’s beliefs serve as a stark contrast to the
moral reading theory, which is why his viewpoint is relevant.
Robert Bork’s Originalist Theory
In order to better understand Dworkin’s concept of the moral reading theory, it is
important to understand why he rejects the originalist theory. His rejection of originialism is best
seen in Chapters 12-14 of Freedom’s Law where Dworkin argues against the originalist Robert
Bork. Dworkin first describes Bork as “a constitutional radical who rejects a requirement of the
rule of law that all sides in that debate had previously accepted” (Dworkin 1996, 265). Bork
believes the Constitution should be “guided by the intention of the framers, and nothing more”
(Dworkin 1996, 267). However, Dworkin modifies this notion, stating:
If we are to accept the thesis that the Constitution is limited to what the framers
intended it to be, then we must understand their intentions as large and abstract
convictions of principle, not narrow opinions about particular responsibility to
judges than Bork’s repeated claims about judicial restraint suggest. For then any
description of original intention is a conclusion that must be justified not by
history alone, but by some very different form of argument (Dworkin 1996, 269).
Dworkin reinforces the idea that the Framer’s would not have intended to apply “narrow
opinions on responsibility” because it would hinder the document from surviving
2

It is important to understand the difference between original intent, and original meaning. The theory of original
intent is a theory of interpretation by which judges attempt to ascertain the meaning of a particular provision of the
Constitution by determining how the provision was understood at the time it was drafted and ratified, focusing
specifically how the Founders understood it. Original meaning focuses the understanding on the people of that time
period, and how they would have understood the Constitution. In recent years, original intent has been abandoned
due to a lack of substantial evidence to support the claims made under that theory. The use of original intent is a
major contributor to Bork being labeled radical in his beliefs.
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throughout generations. Dworkin states “time has given us the information and
understanding that they lacked” (Dworkin 1996, 271), which was why the Constitution
could not be interpreted as precise guidelines for everyone to follow. As time goes on,
the levels of responsibility change with the influx of new technology and need for more
security. However, Bork is confident that the originalist understanding of the
Constitution is the correct interpretation. Dworkin summarizes Bork, stating:
First, any method not based on original understanding requires judges to make
“major moral choices.” Second, judges cannot show that they have legitimate
authority to make major moral decisions for the rest of the community. Third, in
the absence of such authority, judges must only make decisions based on a moral
theory the public would accept. Fourth, since people disagree deeply on matters
of morality, no such moral theory exists, and judges therefore must not make
moral choices (Dworkin 1996, 302).
On the first argument, that judges are required to make “major moral choices” for the rest
of us under the moral reading theory, Dworkin argues “We cannot coherently assign
these decisions back to the framers; we must make them, on grounds of political morality
for ourselves” (Dworkin 1996, 297). It is beneficial for judges to be the ones who make
these “major moral choices” because they are non-partisan, and are appointed based on
their knowledge of legal texts, the rule of law, etc. Dworkin even argues for judicial
activism, and argues that the Court, being the only countermajoritarian body in the
United States Government, is the best interpreter of the law based on the abstract moral
principles it presents. The prestige of the position of a judge on the Supreme Court, and
the length of the appointment process ensures that judges do have the legitimate authority
to make these decisions. Dworkin also argues that “Bork rejects the positions that judges
have legitimate authority under our system of government to make controversial and
important moral judgments in the course of a good faith interpretation of the Constitution.
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But that view – that under the best understanding of our constitutional democracy judges
do have such authority, legitimately – is very widely accepted” (Dworkin 1996, 302). In
other words, although Bork rejects the authority of judges, the majority of other scholars
and citizens alike recognize such authority.
The third argument is that judges would only make decisions based on what the
public would accept. However, Dworkin argues this best when he states “The point of
integrity is principle, not uniformity” (Dworkin 1996, 83). As previously stated, in order
for any judicial decision to have authority and standing, it must uphold the integrity of
previous decisions. Dworkin argues that “Judges in the mainstream of our constitutional
practice are much more respectful of the framer’s intentions, understood as a matter of
principle than Bork is. They accept the responsibility the framers imposed on them, to
develop legal principles of moral breadth to protect the rights of individuals against the
majority” (Dworkin 1996, 273). Judges adhere to protecting the rights of the individual
when making their moral decisions, not based on what a majority party would like. This
once again affirms Dworkin’s idea of the Court as a countermajoritarian body of the
government. The Court interprets the law in a way that reflects on individual rights, and
is not subject to pressure from the majority. This can be seen in Dworkin’s
conceptualization of an ideal democracy, based on individual participation and reflection.
The fourth argument Bork makes, that not everyone can agree on one moral
principle, is not seen as a problem for Dworkin. He states “The best explanation of the
differing patterns of their decisions lies in their different understandings of central moral
values embedded in the Constitution’s text” (Dworkin 1996, 2). It is important that each
individual interpret the meaning of the Constitution for themselves, and this therefore
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results in different moral theories. He states “We cannot coherently assign these decisions
back to the framers; we must make them, on grounds of political morality, for ourselves”
(Dworkin 1996, 297). This is not a bad thing for Dworkin, because these different moral
theories will be forced to compete with one another, in order to arrive at what is the
“best” interpretation of the constitutional principle in question. Dworkin rejects most, if
not all of Bork’s arguments for originalism and concludes “The only impossibility in this
story, in other words, is the impossibility of Bork’s rescuing his argument from selfcontradiction” (Dworkin 1996, 302).
Dworkin’s Rejection of Originalism
Although Robert Bork’s argument for originalism seems weak, there are Supreme Court
Justices today, such as Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas, who believe that originalism is the
most appropriate way to interpret the Constitution. However, Dworkin rejects this theory on
multiple levels. His first argument is a common one that can apply to all cases where there are
multiple authors of a governmental document. Dworkin states “The thesis insists that judges
interpret the Constitution to mean only what the framers intended it to mean. But the framers
had two very different kinds of intention that, in very different senses, constituted what they
meant. They had linguistic intentions, that is, intentions that the Constitution contain particular
statements. They also had legal intentions, that is, intentions about what the law would be in
virtue of these statements” (Dworkin 1996, 291). The originalist theory suggests that there is no
distinction, and that the linguistic intentions are the same as the legal ones. Originalists equate
what the words say, with what they were intended to mean. Dworkin also recognizes the
difficulty in trying to determine exactly what the Framer’s intentions were. In “Modern
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Jurisprudence and the Transvaluation of Liberal Constitutionalism,” Gary J. Jacobsohn lays out
an argument for this difficulty. He states:
Initially Dworkin argues that “judges cannot decide what the pertinent intention
of the Framers was… unless they make substantive political decisions of just the
sort of proponents of intention or process think judges should not make.” And
later he writes that “most of the delegates and congressmen who voted for the
‘broad’ provisions of the Constitution probably did not have an interpretive
intention that favored concrete intentions. There is no reason to suppose they
thought that congressmen and legislators should be guided by their, the Framer’s,
conceptions of due process of equality or cruelty, right or wrong” (Jacobsohn
1985, 417).
Dworkin finds it very difficult, with the multiplicity of ideas surrounding the intentions
for the language of the Constitution and the principles it entails, to find out exactly what
they intended to say. Dworkin states “We must assume that the legal intentions of the
framers were honorable rather than cynical. They intended to commit the nation to
abstract principles of political morality about speech and punishment and equality, for
example” (Dworkin 1996, 293-294).
Conclusion
Dworkin finds originalism to be an ineffective way of interpreting the Constitution. It is
unrealistic to interpret the Constitution as presenting concrete regulations against the behavior of
citizens in society, and not as a guide to providing abstract moral principles that would lead to a
successful society. He therefore formally rejects the originalist theory, stating:
it is as indefensible in principle as it is unpalatable in result, moreover. It is as
illegitimate to substitute concrete, detailed provision for the abstract language of
the equal protection clause as it would be to substitute some abstract principle of
privacy for concrete terms of the Third Amendment, or to treat the clause
imposing a minimum age for President as enacting some general principle of
disability for persons under that age (Dworkin 1996, 13-14).
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According to Dworkin, what is more important is identifying the abstract moral
principles inherent in the text of the Constitution. These moral principles are what
society should be based on, because they ensure equality and the protection of individual
rights, without completely altering the message the founding fathers present. Judges use
the moral theory unconsciously when making decisions as a part of human nature.
Dworkin’s moral reading theory serves as a valid alternative to originalism, and points to
the many flaw originalism has.
Wilson and Dworkin
Now that Dworkin’s theory of constitutional interpretation has been identified, it is
possible to compare it to James Wilson’s theory of constitutional interpretation. In this section,
Dworkin’s theory of constitutional interpretation will be reviewed more in depth, focusing
specifically on his idea of an ideal judge. Then the similarities between Dworkin and Wilson’s
theories of constitutional interpretation will be discussed, followed by a discussion of the
important distinctions between the two theories. To conclude, Wilson’s theory will be used to
show why Dworkin’s theory is too radical according to the framework Wilson has established,
and discuss its implications for how both Dworkin and Wilson should be interpreted.
Similarities
In order to understand where the theories between Dworkin and Wilson differ, it is important
first to look at the similarities between the two. Both Dworkin and Wilson agree that the source
of judicial decision making should be the Constitution, and that a set of latent moral principles
should be applied when interpreting the Constitution. The Constitution itself is seen by both
Wilson and Dworkin to contain moral principles. Both theorists also agree that maintaining the
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integrity of the Constitution is important in judicial decision making. The Constitution should be
the basis of all judicial decision making. In addition, Dworkin and Wilson both incorporate
natural law and natural rights into their theory of constitutional interpretation. Both theories
recognize that there are moral principles, by which the law should be based upon. They also
agree that the Constitution contains these moral principles, and it is the job of the judge to
interpret and to teach what these moral principles mean through their decisions.
Dworkin and Wilson also agree that a key aspect to a theory of constitutional interpretation is
responsibility. Dworkin describes responsibility as “compatible with any assumption we can
sensibly entertain about what causes our various decisions and what the neutral consequences are
of those decisions” (Dworkin 2011, 12-13). This idea of responsibility influences his concept of
dignity, more specifically the second principle. He states “We each have a sovereign ethical
responsibility to make something of value of our own lives” (Dworkin 2011, 13). This idea is
consistent with Wilson’s understanding of citizenship. Dworkin and Wilson both agree that an
individual should respect the lives of others and they would their own. This idea of dignity is the
basis of society. Wilsons states “We trust that, in the future, men, instead of knowing and
treating one another as enemies, and as engaged in enterprises mutually destructive, will know
and treat one another as friends, and as jointly operating in plans and systems for promoting
prosperity, the virtue, and the felicity of the human race” (Wilson 2007, 936). An individual
cannot be only concerned with themselves, because it would not be morally responsible. Instead,
Wilson and Dworkin encourage looking at personal actions as contributing to the whole of
society. Wilson expresses this idea of society working together stating “Let us, then, cherish; let
us encourage; let us admire; let us teach; let us practice this ‘devotion to this public,’ so
meritorious, and so necessary to the peace, and greatness, and happiness of the United States”
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(Wilson 2007, 671). In order to do this, Dworkin emphasizes the importance of filters.
Dworkin states “Responsibility requires us critically to interpret the convictions that seem
initially most appealing or natural – to seek understanding and specifications of these initially
appealing convictions with those two goals of integrity and authenticity in mind. We interpret
each of these convictions, so far as we can, in the light of the others and also in the light of what
feels natural to us as a suitable way to live our lives” (Dworkin 2011, 108-109). Through
individual reflection on the morality of individual actions, individuals will learn to modify their
actions to be morally responsible and beneficial to society as a whole.
Another similarity between the two theories is the rejection of the Causal Impact
Hypothesis. 3 Dworkin claims the Causal Impact Hypothesis is a myth stating “even if we
assume that moral truth does have mysterious causal potency, that assumption could be of no
help whatsoever in justifying our moral beliefs” (Dworkin 2011, 74). Dworkin’s major issue
with the Casual Impact Hypothesis is that it claims to be value neutral. Dworkin states “CI is not
a mistake about what there is. It is a confusion about what can count as an argument for the truth
of a moral conviction. Only moral argument can. CI is a mistake because it violates Hume’s
principle” (Dworkin 2011, 75). Dworkin disregards CI because Hume’s principle says that a
value neutral theory is impossible. Hume’s principle restated is “any argument that either
supports or undermines a moral claim must include or presuppose further moral claims or
assumptions” (Dworkin 2011, 99). Wilson would agree with this. Wilson states “Laws may be
promulgated by reason and conscience, the divine monitors within us” (Wilson 2007, 470). This
suggests that even the law, which applies universally to society, is not value neutral. Wilson’s
3

The Causal Impact Hypothesis assumes that there are preexisting moral facts that speak to moral truths.
Individuals recognize moral principles by recognizing these moral facts, without any sort of value associated with it.
Individuals recognize something is morally right because of these moral facts, not because of the values associated
with these truths.
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concept of judicial decision making supports this. As stated earlier, according to Wilson, a judge
must use both reason and the common sense to arrive at a morally responsible decision.
Scientific reasoning is inadequate by itself, and must be connected with a body of moral
principles. Therefore, Wilson and Dworkin would both reject the Causal Impact Hypothesis on
the basis of Hume’s principle, that a theory of interpretation cannot be value neutral.
Differences
After reviewing the similarities between the two theories in the previous section, this
section will address the differences between the two theories. Wilson would argue that
Dworkin’s theory pushes his framework too far, by pushing philosophy to its limits. Dworkin’s
particular concept of a judge is as a Philosopher King, who governs because he knows the truth.
This idea of a judge is in direct tension with Wilson’s concept of a judge as an educator for the
sovereign people. Dworkin applies Hume’s principle to suggest that a morally superior decision
would override the Constitution, because the Constitution is majoritarian. Dworkin’s rejection of
the majoritarian premise leads to this conclusion. Therefore, according to Dworkin, a judge has
the responsibility to arrive at the truth, without necessarily using the Constitution as the basis of
his or her decision making. Wilson would reject this idea, on the basis that the Constitution is
written to be democratic, and the sovereign will of the people. By removing the majoritarian
aspect of the Constitution, its purpose would be essentially undermined. Dworkin’s view would
provide too much discretion to judges, by encouraging them to consult dicta instead of
consulting the Constitution itself. Dworkin would combat this with the two restraints he
identifies in his theory of judicial decision making. The first is judges are to look at “what the
framers said.” Dworkin uses the analogy of a father teaching his children about moral concepts
to demonstrate that the Founders did not intend for the Constitution to be interpreted strictly.
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Instead, they viewed the Constitution as a guideline of abstract moral principles. Dworkin states
“The Constitution enacts abstract principles that judges must interpret, as best they can,
according to their own lights” (Dworkin 1996, 299). This further encourages consulting outside
sources to interpret the Constitution that have the possibility of being inconsistent with
Constitutional principles and constitutional structure. The second restraint on judges Dworkin
identifies is the requirement of constitutional integrity. He claims precedent and the
responsibility of judges to respect previous decisions are enough of a restraint to avoid a
judiciary with absolute power.
In response to Dworkin’s two restraints on judges, Wilson would respond that his theory
is more concrete. Although Dworkin sees this as a good thing, stating “What interpretation lacks
is exactly what gives science a sense of solidity” (Dworkin 2011, 155), Wilson’s theory creates a
firmer and safer alternative. According to Wilson, judges should implement “principles and rules
of genuine policy and natural justice for the purpose of promoting a true ‘science of law’”
(Wilson 2007, xxiii). Wilson uses his concept of a true science of law in combination with the
moral sense as the framework of how judges should make decisions. The science of law, which
can be accorded with reason, acts as a restriction on the passions of the moral sense that could
lead an individual to act on their own beliefs, as opposed to making a morally responsible
decision. Wilson states “Every free citizen and every free man has duties to perform and rights
to claim. Unless, in some measure, and in some degree, he knows those duties and those rights,
he can never act a just an independent part” (Wilson 2007, 435). In order for citizens to exercise
these duties, they must be educated on them. Wilson states “against this ungenerous application
of one of the noblest propensities of our nature, the system of our education and our law ought to
be directed with the most vigorous and unremitted ardor” (Wilson 2007, 670). Wilson is
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concerned with educating the American citizenry so they can perform their responsibilities as
principle sovereign, which indicates that Wilson is essentially concerned with the good and
ultimately the perfection of the United States. His concern is fundamentally political. He places
the role of education in the hands of the judge because the judge is a member of the most
apolitical branch of government, and will therefore not interfere with the will of the people,
unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution. In this case, Wilson’s judge has the job of
educating the people on making morally responsible decisions by interpreting the Constitution
and explaining its implications through their decisions. In contrast, Dworkin’s emphasis on the
role of a judge as educator is both narrower and broader than Wilson’s. Dworkin is narrower in
the sense that he is primarily concerned with judges, and not society. While Dworkin is
concerned that the people be free to make moral choices, he seems to be rather neutral with
regard to the nature of these choices. It is only important that individuals are free to make these
choices, and that they are consistent with his two principles of dignity. Wilson’s view is that the
people should be educated on what decision to make. Dworkin is broader in the sense that he is
concerned with moral truth at a universal level, in contrast to Wilson who is concerned with the
political implications of moral responsibility. The problem with Dworkin’s theory, is that he
fails to recognize the first principle of constitutional design, that constitutions must fit the people
in order to be legitimate and binding (Lutz 2006, 18; Aristotle 1984, 1289b10-25). Constitutions
and the moral principles and values they embody must fit the moral principles and values of the
people. Dworkin refuses to recognize this with his emphasis on philosophic truth at the expense
of any political considerations.
The structure of the two theories is another important distinction. Wilson constructs an
abstract framework to apply reason, in order to simplify that framework in a way that will be
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easier for the sovereign people to understand. Dworkin pushes this framework further, by
allowing judges too much power by focusing on finding truth through moral principles that are
not necessarily found in the Constitution. Dworkin’s theory works from the top to bottom,
starting with the truth, then focusing on key values, such as the two principles of dignity,
deriving the truth from these values, with moral responsibility as a limitation. Wilson’s theory
works from the bottom-up, with a moral document (the Constitution) as the base, and using
reasoning based on scientific principles and the common sense to arrive at a morally responsible
decision at the top. Wilson’s theory would be considered too narrow for Dworkin. However,
Wilson would argue that his theory is narrow in order to better protect the people because it
supports the majoritarian nature of the Constitution and is more applicable to its political
implications.
A key issue between Dworkin and Wilson’s theory is the role of judge versus the
legislator. Wilson strictly adheres to the idea of boundaries between the three branches set by
the Constitution. However, Dworkin’s theory appears to blur those boundaries. Dworkin states
“In conceptual interpretation the distinction between author and interpreter vanishes: we have
together created what we each and together interpret” (Dworkin 2011, 157). According to this
logic, the interpreter, the judge, becomes the author. This would entail that judges can make law,
which is in direct tension with Wilson, and with constitutional boundaries. Viewing the job of
judges as representatives, the first role of a judge is that judges should not make law. It is clear
that Wilson does not agree that judges have the constitutional authority to make law in his
proposal of a Council of Revision. A Council of Revision would not be needed if judges could
make law. It is clear that the legislature is the only branch of government with the constitutional
authority to make the law, and by Dworkin suggesting that “the author” and “the interpreter” are
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not distinct from one another would suggest that the integrity of the Constitution would be
diminished. This if fine for Dworkin because he is ultimately more concerned with moral than
constitutional integrity. Wilson would agree that the Constitution should be interpreted with
moral integrity. However he would disagree with Dworkin, and instead argue that the author of
the Constitution does not change, consistent with his view of popular sovereignty. The Founding
Fathers created the Constitution, and the job of a judge is to interpret the Constitution to the
extent of an interpreter, not an author. If judges had this power, the Constitution would literally
be a “living document,” subject to the trends and passions of society, thereby destroying its
integrity and legitimacy as a moral document that withstands large spans of time. Giving judges
this power blurs the distinction between the legislature and the judge, violating the constitutional
principle of separation of powers.

In doing this, Dworkin also violates one of his own

limitations on the moral theory. Earlier, Dworkin was quoted saying that judges must respect the
moral principles contained in the Constitution, as well as its “structural design.” By blurring the
distinction between the legislative and judicial power, he is simultaneously blurring the
distinction between legislative and judicial responsibility. This creates a problem with
Dworkin’s moral theory, because he contradicts the limitations he places on it.
Dworkin bases his theory on a value based theory of interpretation, stating “we should
treat moral reasoning as a form of interpretive reasoning and that we can achieve moral
responsibility only by aiming at the most comprehensive account we can achieve of a larger
system of value in which our moral opinions figure” (Dworkin 2011, 38-39). Although Wilson
and Dworkin can both agree that a theory that is morally responsible cannot be value neutral,
Dworkin rejects Wilson’s concept of common sense. Wilson offers an answer to this critique
stating “This philosophy will teach us, that first principles are in themselves apparent; that to
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make nothing self evident, is to take away all possibility of knowing anything; that without first
principles, there can be neither reason nor reasoning; that discursive knowledge requires intuitive
maxims as its basis; that if every truth would admit of proof, proof would extend to infinity; that,
consequently, all sound reasoning must rest ultimately on the principles of common sense –
principles supported by original and intuitive evidence” (Wilson 2007, 603-604). Wilson argues
that all ideas initially begin from an intuitive maxim. This intuitive maxim allows for reasoning
and reflection on which to derive the truth from. The example of first principles presents some
concepts that are self-evident, and therefore do not necessarily need to be interpreted to be
understood. However, there are other concepts, that are not self-evident, in which the common
sense in combination with reason, must work to reach a morally responsible decision. Reasoning
and interpretation alone are not enough to arrive at a morally responsible decision. Wilson
states “Some first principle yield conclusions, which are certain; others yield such only as are
probably. In just reasoning, the strength or weakness of the conclusion will always correspond
to the strength or weakness of the principles, on which it is grounded” (Wilson 2007, 618). This
idea connects back to Wilson’s concern with the political nature of constitutional interpretation.
A morally responsible decision for Wilson is not only informed by general principles of
morality, but is also formed by the particular considerations and values of the political
community for which it governs. This is especially important in the role of a judge where
Wilson would use their decision making as an attempt to bridge the divide between the
general/universal maxims and the particular. Dworkin theory, on the other hand, seems to focus
exclusively at a general level. This raises questions about Dworkin’s ability to reconcile theory
and practice, where Wilson seems to have this as an aim of his theory of constitutional
interpretation.
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Wilson would also reject Dworkin’s value based theory because of its instability.
Dworkin embraces the instability of his interpretive theory, stating “the active holism of
interpretation means, on the contrary, that there is no firm ground at all, that even when our
interpretive conclusions seem inescapable, when we think there really is nothing to think, we are
still stalked by the ineffability of that conviction” (Dworkin 2011, 155). Wilson grounding
decision on scientific principles is strengthened by its solidity. For Wilson, in the judge’s role as
an educator uses the science of law as a basis of teaching individuals about their rights and
duties. It is important that the basis of this education be solidified, as it is with the science of
law. If Dworkin’s theory were to be followed, where interpretation does not have a solid basis,
the education of individuals would be inconsistent and would prevent unity in society. Dworkin
tries to combat this theory, stating that solidity is not necessary for morally responsible decision
making. He states “the fact that the justifying goals of science are irrelevant to truth is another
source of solidity in science. Knowing that people’s differences in what they take to be the
justifying goals of science can play no role in fixing what they take to be scientific truth makes it
profitable for us to expect convergence of opinion in that domain” (Dworkin 2011, 155).
Dworkin disagrees with the use of solid principles because he does not believe they will equate
to the truth, which is his central focus.
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Chapter Five: Conclusion
This chapter serves to summarize Wilson’s theory of constitutional interpretation and
identify its implications for modern jurisprudence. First, this chapter summarizes Wilson’s
theory of constitutional interpretation. Second, it discusses the different sources of political
philosophy that each of the theories discussed in Chapter One derive their ideas on constitutional
interpretation from. The purpose of this discussion is to assist in the process of placing Wilson’s
thought within the competing theories of how judges should make decisions. Lastly, I discuss
James Wilson’s own judicial opinion in the case of Chisholm v Georgia (1793), to examine how
his theory works in practice.
James Wilson’s theory of constitutional interpretation is distinguished from other theories
of constitutional interpretation because of its unique reliance on popular sovereignty. Wilson
employs a multi-dimensional understanding of sovereignty in the form of a principle-agent
relationship. This principle-agent relationship consists of two dimensions, principled
sovereignty and derived sovereignty. In this relationship, the principle sovereign is the
American people, who are responsible for the creation and limitation of government through the
drafting of the Constitution. The government is limited from infringing upon this principle
sovereignty by the constitutional constraints of representation, separation of powers and
federalism. The implication of this principle-agent relationship on the role of a judge attaches
three responsibilities: as an agent to the people, as a representative and as an educator. These
three responsibilities help to aid the people in recognizing their role as principle sovereign and
understanding the nature of their responsibilities as the principle sovereign. When making
decisions, Wilson argues that judges should use Hobbesian scientific reasoning with a
combination of the moral sense to arrive at a morally responsible and accurate interpretation of
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the Constitution. In order to understand where Wilson’s theory of constitutional interpretation
fits in with the other established schools of constitutional interpretation, this chapter discusses
the origins of each of the other theories of constitutional interpretation, and compares them with
the origins of Wilson’s theory.
The natural law theory of constitutional interpretation is based on the writings of
St.Thomas Aquinas. George states “the theory’s rootedness in the tradition of thought about
practical reason and morality in which St. Thomas Aquinas is so central a figure…” (George
2001, 1). Although Wilson incorporates the natural law in his own theory of constitutional
interpretation, he should not be considered as Thomistic. According to Velazquez in
“Rethinking America’s Modernity: Natural Law, Natural Rights and the Character of James
Wilson’s Liberal Republicanism,” Wilson explicitly distances himself from Aquinas’ natural law
teaching. Velazquez states “Wilson’s turn to the Scots is not intended to support a Thomistic,
classical republican, or civic humanist understanding of human nature, civil and political
society, nor is it meant as a repudiation of modern, liberal social contract theory” (Velazquez
1996, 216). Velazquez makes this assertion based on Wilson’s account of humanity doing good,
which according to Velazquez, provides evidence of Wilson’s reliance on Hobbes, Locke and the
Scots, rather than on Christian Aristotelians (Velazquez 1996, 208). Wilson relies on these
theorists, rather than Aquinas because he believes a key part of citizenship is reciprocal
assistance. Velazquez states “Wilson’s natural law does not amount to a human being’s
participation in the higher law of reason or logos… the law of nature is for Wilson… rooted in
the passions, not least of which is the ubiquitous desire of self-preservation. Reason is thus an
instrument in the service of fundamental feelings” (Velazquez 1996, 195-6). Wilson is also
distinct from theorists of natural law because he believes that the individual remains prior to the
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political community. This is contrary to both Aristotle and the Thomistic political animals
(Velazquez 1996, 214). This idea of the individual existing before society implores a leaning
towards the natural rights theory, rather than the natural law.
Wilson and Barnett both derive their ideas of natural rights thinking from John Locke.
According to Velazquez, Wilson is attracted to Locke because “In Locke we thus find an explicit
duty to respect the rights of our fellow human beings to life, liberty and estate” (Velazquez 1996,
209). These rights are the primary fact from which Wilson reasons towards civil society and
government. However, where the two differ is on the issue of consent. Barnett argues that a
government that is legitimized by consent can only be legitimate if the consent is unanimous.
Barnett states “Anything less than unanimous consent cannot bind those who dissent” (Barnett
2004, 25). Wilson rejects this view of consent, arguing that a majority decision can be morally
binding, and unanimity is not required for that consent to be considered legitimate. Wilson states
“The only rational and natural method, therefore, of constituting civil society, is by the
convention or consent of the members, who compose it. For by a civil society we properly
understand the voluntary union of persons in the same end and in the same means requisite to
obtain that end. This union is a benefit, not a sacrifice: civil is an addition to the natural order”
(Wilson 2007, 635). By suggesting that unanimous consent is required for legitimate
government, Barnett places a heavy restriction on the ability of government to aid the sovereign
people as their agent. Barnett’s fear is that the people’s natural liberty will be hindered by less
than unanimous consent, because the government as instituted by the Constitution places too
much power in the hands of government. In contrast, Wilson argues that in the efforts to strive
for perfection in society, government will lead to the expansion of natural liberty, while also
protecting it because the people have consented to it. Wilson describes natural liberty as
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“provided he does not injury to others; and provided some public interests do not demand his
labours. This right is natural liberty. Every man has a sense of this right. Every man has a sense
of the impropriety of restraining or interrupting it” (Wilson 2007, 638). Based on Wilson’s
theory of the moral sense, every individual has a sense of natural liberty, and a sense that they
should respect the natural liberty of others. Through this common sentiment, consent of the
majority effectively engages people to participate in society. Wilson states “In the social
compact, each individual engages with the whole collectively, and the whole collectively engage
with each individual” (Wilson 2007, 636). As every individual works towards the ends of
society, they are exercising their own natural liberty, while protecting the natural liberty of
others. Government is instituted to protect this relationship, and to connect individuals with the
moral sense to recognize that natural liberty is shared by all. This sense is what makes the law,
and the Constitution morally binding, not unanimous consent.
The common law tradition focuses on Aristotelian prudence. According to Stoner, Coke
agrees with Aristotle, and equates his view of prudence with jurisprudence. Stoner states “the
completely virtuous man must be a judge, or at least a man of judgment” (Stoner 1992, 18).
Wilson also derives some of his ideas from Aristotelian prudence, focusing on Aristotle’s view
of equity. Wilson quotes Aristotle, stating “equity may be well deemed the conductor of law
towards a state of refinement and perfection” (Wilson 2007, 934). Equity is used to correct the
law for its defects, and places the judge in a position to correct these defects through their
decision making. Wilson recognizes that the legislature does not have the ability to foresee
every possible outcome of the legislation they pass, so he places the responsibility on judges to
educate the legislature through its decision and constitutional interpretation. This idea of equity
conforms a court of law and a court of equity into one body, which were separated as part of
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English common law. According to Aristotle, the defects in the law are that they are too general.
Equity is used as a means of conforming the law to the people it governs, and therefore making
the law more particular. Wilson would agree that the law should be tailored to the people it
governs. However, Wilson seems to replace Aristotle’s view of equity with Hobbesian scientific
reasoning. His reason for this is that Hobbesian scientific reasoning provides a more solid
foundation for the law and judicial decision making than the common law does. The common
law is flexible and conforms to the people, but it does not provide a solid foundation for making
decisions, other than precedent. By looking at the general principles within the law, rather than
the particulars, a more comprehensive and legitimate form of law is created.
Dworkin’s theory of constitutional interpretation relies on the theories of Plato.
According to Dworkin, Plato constructed his moral and political theories around interpretations
of virtues and vices (Dworkin 2011, 184). Plato’s interpretation has two parts. The first is to
“analyze each of the virtues and vices they took up by constructing conceptions of each that draw
upon and reinforce the conceptions they favored of the others. They showed these virtues, that
is, as forming a mutually supportive network of moral values” (Dworkin 2011, 184). The
second stage was to find “interconnections between the network of moral concepts and ethics”
(Dworkin 2011, 184). This idea of analyzing virtues and vices connects with Dworkin’s value
based theory of interpretation, in which Dworkin argues that his goal of interpretation is to create
a fully articulated idea of value for a given concept. Dworkin and Plato both focus on unity in
this respect. Dworkin also discusses Plato’s conception of justice as counterintuitive, stating “he
analyzes that concept to include a psychic condition of the agent. He seeks an account not of just
actions but of a just person, and he identifies a just person, in the first instance, not as someone
who cares about others but as someone who cares about the goodness of his own being”
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(Dworkin 2011, 185). This connects directly with Dworkin’s first principle of dignity, which
states “you must treat the success of your own life as a matter of objective importance” (Dworkin
2011, 255). He then states that Plato’s concept of justice “tries to explain how the enlightened
promotion of self gives one an interest in the well-being of others” (Dworkin 2011, 185). This
idea connects directly to Dworkin’s second principle of dignity, which states “authenticity,
assigns each of us a personal responsibility to act consistently with the character and projects he
identifies for himself” (Dworkin 2011, 261). In order to have an effective and positive impact on
others, one must focus on their own individual well-being first according to both Dworkin and
Plato. Dworkin explains his concept of dignity further, stating “your reason for thinking it
objectively important how your life goes is also a reason you have for thinking it important how
anyone’s life goes: you see the objective importance of your life mirrored in the objective
importance of everyone else’s” (Dworkin 2011, 260). Dworkin focuses on the self in both of his
principles of dignity, rather than society as a collective whole.
This theory of interpretation does not fit within Wilson’s model for judges. Wilson
focuses on the well-being of the people at large, placing the responsibility of educating the
citizens about the law and the Constitution on judges. Wilson’s support of a majoritarian society
would suggest that although the individual is important, equally as important is working together
and recognizing each others’ wants, needs, and goals. Wilson says “Society is necessary as well
as natural to us” (Wilson 2007, 630). Individuals are meant to work together and better one
another, not necessarily work separate and distance from each other. Wilson supports this,
stating “We trust that, in the future, men, instead of knowing and treating one another as
enemies, and as engaged in enterprises mutually destructive, will know and treat one another as
friends, and as jointly operating in plans and systems for promoting the prosperity, the virtue,
116

and the felicity of the human race” (Wilson 2007, 936). Dworkin’s support of individual
improvement over the improvement of society as a whole is connected with his overall rejection
of the majoritarian premise. Dworkin and Plato focus on individual virtue and happiness, which
will lead to the virtue and happiness of the city. Wilson differs from this model, looking towards
his idea of citizenship to work towards the virtue and happiness of the city.
Based on Wilson’s theory of constitutional interpretation, it would seem that Wilson
would reject modern jurisprudence. Through their decision making, judges have effectively
narrowed down the rights protected by the Constitution into spheres. This constriction of rights,
Wilson would argue, is actually moving away from the intended purpose of the Constitution as
the original will of the sovereign people. This is best exemplified in his own judicial opinion in
the case of Chisholm v Georgia (1793). In this case, the state of Georgia refused to make
payments pursuant to a contract for supplies from a South Carolina businessman. Once the
merchant had died, the executor of his estate Alexander Chisholm brought suit against the state
for the default payments. The state of Georgia made the argument that as a sovereign state,
federal courts did not have the authority to prosecute. The question before the court was whether
or not the state of Georgia was subject to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the federal
court system. In a 4-1 decision, the justices decided that the people of the United States intended
to bind the states through the legislative, executive and judicial powers of the federal
government, and that the sovereign power was contained within the people of the United States,
not the “artificial person” of the State.
Wilson begins his opinion by discussing the topic of sovereignty. Wilson describes the
problem of sovereignty, stating “As the state has claimed precedence of the people, so, in the
same inverted course of things, the government has often claimed precedence of the state, and to
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this perversion in the second degree, many of the volumes of confusion concerning sovereignty
owe their existence” (Wilson 1793, 3). Wilson first addresses this problem by looking towards
the text of the Constitution. Wilson states “To the Constitution of the United States, the term
Sovereign, it totally unknown… With regard to one of the terms, ‘state,’ this authority is
declared; with regard to the other, ‘sovereign,’ the authority is implied only” (Wilson 1793, 2).
This statement about sovereignty exemplifies Wilson’s concept of the principle-agent
relationship between the sovereign people and the government. By saying that sovereignty is
implied only to the states signifies that the people hold sovereignty explicitly. Wilson describes
the relationship stating “state governments were made for man, and, at the same time, how true it
is that his creatures and servants have first deceived, next vilified, and, at last, oppressed their
master and maker” (Wilson 1793, 2-3). The state of Georgia claiming they retain the sovereign
power suggests a rejection that the people are the principle sovereign. The states were instituted
to serve as agents to the people, and according to Wilson “a state [should] be considered as
subordinate to the people” (Wilson 1793, 3). According to Wilson, each individual state is
considered to be an “artificial person,” created to serve the people, who retain the sovereign
power. Wilson describes this relationship, stating that the citizens of Georgia “did not surrender
the supreme or sovereign power to that state, but, as to the purposes of the Union, retained it to
themselves” (Wilson 1793, 5). In order to create legitimacy to the government, the principle
sovereign must be within the people. Wilson states “laws derived from the pure source of
equality and justice must be founded on the consent of those whose obedience they require. The
sovereign, when traced to his source, must be found in the man” (Wilson 1793, 6). It is
important to the idea of legitimacy that the sovereign power be in the body of the people and not
the state, because if the state were to retain the sovereign power, the government would no
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longer be majoritarian and democratic, but instead term into a form of despotism. The state, and
the federal government, are created in order to aid the sovereign people in perfecting society.
The states and the federal government create structure and order so that these goals can be
achieved. Wilson describes the purpose for instituting government by comparing it to the
election of a King. Wilson states “We, who are of as great worth as you, and can do more than
you can do, elect you to be our King upon the conditions stipulated. But between you and us,
there is one of greater authority than you” (Wilson 1793, 7). This suggests that although the
people provide the government with authority, they do so knowing that they are the true principle
sovereign, and have the ability to change the government when they feel it is necessary. It is the
key to democracy that the chosen leaders of society are not seen as having more power than the
individuals in society. Wilson states “Judges ought to know that the poorest peasant is a man as
well as the King himself; all men ought to obtain justice, since, in the estimation of justice, all
men are equal, whether the Prince complain of a peasant, or a peasant complain of the Prince”
(Wilson 1793, 8). According to Wilson, all men should be subject to the same justice and
equality.
James Wilson’s theory of constitutional interpretation is based on the multi-dimensional
concept of popular sovereignty, where a principle-agent relationship exists between the
individuals that make up society, and the government that provides order to society. Wilson’s
ideas incorporate natural law, natural right, and Hobbesian scientific reasoning, in combination
with his idea of the moral sense. It is clear when fully analyzing Wilson’s theory that he cannot
be placed within any of the schools of constitutional interpretation entirely, because he
incorporates multiple different philosophies within his own theory. By reflecting on Wilson’s
theory of constitutional interpretation, and looking at its implications for modern jurisprudence,
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it would seem that the Court has effectively restricted the rights of the people under the
Constitution more so than was originally intended during its creation. When looking at the
Constitution through Wilson’s perspective, the people are the true rulers of society, not
necessarily the government, which is very different from how society is viewed today.
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